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The common law has always recognized a man's
house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own of-
ficers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the
courts thus close the front entrance to constituted author-
ity, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curi-
osity?'
I. INTRODUCTION
The extent to which an employer can use an employee's off-duty con-
duct as the basis for an adverse employment decision varies widely in the
United States. A consistent standard that will establish reasonable pa-
rameters to protect employees from unreasonable intrusions into their lives
away from work, and that will provide employers with the limited infor-
mation they need for legitimate business purposes, is long overdue. In their
well-known essay "The Right to Privacy," Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis may have expressed their concerns about the press "overstepping
in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency."2 But
the fundamental right they recognized was much broader - that "the
rights, so protected, whatever their exact nature, are not rights arising from
contract or from special trust, but are rights as against the world.. . ,3 As
they acknowledged, from time to time it is necessary to "define anew the
exact nature and extent" of the protection that the law provides.4 It took
nearly a hundred years for both common law and state statutory law to be-
gin addressing the privacy rights of off-duty workers in relation to the em-
ployer's infringement of those rights. Over the last decade those rights
have become even more defined, yet large discrepancies in the law are cre-
ating many unsettling questions about employers' use of their employees'
off-duty conduct in making employment decisions
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REV. 193, 220 (1890).
2. Id. at 196.
3. Id. at 213.
4. Id. at 193.
5. See generally John Edward Davidson, Reconciling the Tension Between Em-
ployer Liability and Employee Privacy, 8 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 145, 148-49 (1"998)
(proposing a return to the doctrine of respondeat superior to balance employer liability with
worker privacy); Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Em-
ployee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 47 (1997) (examining the statutory
and common law protections of the associational rights of employees); Jason Bosch, Note,
None of your Business (Interest): The Argument for Protecting All Employee Behavior with
No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 639, 640 (2003) (arguing that employers "should
only be able to take employment actions against employees for behavior that sufficiently
impacts legitimate business interests").
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What information can a private6 employer legally obtain about an em-
ployee's off-duty activities? What is a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in the context of an employee's off-duty conduct? When should an em-
ployer be able to use off-duty conduct as the basis for an adverse employ-
ment decision? With these questions in mind, this article looks at trends in
the law of privacy as it pertains to off-duty conduct. When employees
leave work, it is reasonable that they want to be, in the words of a famous
jurist, "let alone.",7 Arguably, as long as they are fulfilling their job respon-
sibilities, they are off their employer's moral, social and political clock.
Employers, on the other hand, may be legitimately concerned about an em-
ployee's off-the-job conduct to the extent that it adversely affects the com-
pany. Moreover, an employer may even be faced with liability for an em-
ployee's off-duty conduct. In such circumstances, it is reasonable that
employers would want to fully investigate the behavior and, if appropriate,
take adverse action against an employee for his or her conduct. Consider
these hypothetical examples:
• Bob, an attorney with a prestigious law firm is ac-
tive in the Log Cabin Republicans. After he was seen
marching in a Gay Pride parade celebrating the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,8 he was "coun-
seled" by the managing partner not to participate in gay
events. He was then removed from participating in a case
with an influential client who is adamantly opposed to gay
rights.
- Sara is a teller at a credit union and she is also a
member of the credit union. After the credit union notes
that Sara has overdrawn her personal checking account
twice, it becomes concerned that she has problems man-
aging her finances. Sara is then fired.
• Grace is a supervisor in a public relations firm
where Sam works as an account manager. After it is dis-
covered that Grace and Sam are dating, they are told that
6. This article focuses on private sector employers. Public sector employers are
subject to additional laws, including compliance with the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and the federal Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (providing
individuals with rights concerning personal information maintained in government record
systems).
7. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed.
1888) (quoted in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195).
8. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (declaring as unconstitutional a statute outlawing
same-sex sodomy).
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they can either quit dating or be faced with the fact that
one of them must leave the company.
- Andrew is employed by a company whose official
corporate purpose is "to glorify God by being a faithful
steward of all that is entrusted to us." After his area man-
ager discovers that Andrew is having an affair, he fires
Andrew.
- Dwayne is a worker in an auto manufacturing plant.
After he writes an inflammatory forum article in the local
newspaper identifying himself as an auto worker and de-
nouncing sport utility vehicle (SUV) owners, his supervi-
sor rescheduled Dwayne for a very undesirable night shift.
To what extent has the employer in each scenario opened itself to le-
gal liability? The rights of employers and employees in these situations
can vary widely based upon the state in which the employee works.
As a result, employers are faced with the dilemma of developing poli-
cies that do not run afoul of their employees' privacy rights. This can be an
especially vexing task for employers with employees in multiple states. To
that end, this article looks at the current state of the law and proposes a set
of guidelines that take into consideration the trends in privacy law for off-
duty behavior. Part II focuses on the growing body of statutory and case
law which defines a reasonable expectation of privacy for employees re-
garding their off-duty conduct. This section does this in three ways.
First, it analyzes cases brought by employees under common law tort
theories for invasion of privacy by intruding upon their seclusion and pub-
licizing private facts, again emphasizing recent cases establishing the pa-
rameters of employee off-duty privacy.
Second, Part II reviews state law protection for off-duty conduct, with
particular emphasis on recent cases interpreting so-called "lifestyle dis-
crimination" statutes.
Third, Part II surveys the protections for off-duty behavior set forth in
federal statutes, with particular emphasis on the Immigration Reform and
Control Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. The confluence
of these common law tort theories, state statutes and federal statutes creates
a reasonable expectation of privacy for off-the-job behavior that does not
affect an employer.
On the other hand, employer liability and effective business operations
can undercut an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy. For this
reason, Part III examines instances in which employers legitimately have
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an interest in investigating off-duty conduct. Three contexts of liability are
discussed to illustrate such circumstances. These include: negligent hiring
or retention, discrimination, and sexual harassment.
Part IV then attempts to reconcile the tension between an employee's
legitimate expectation of privacy outside of the workplace with an em-
ployer's potential liability, by setting forth a proposal that balances reason-
able privacy rights of employees with the needs of employers.
II. "IT'S NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:" EMPLOYEES' REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
Employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy for off-the-job
conduct created by case law, state statutes and federal statutes that have
carved out a common law right to privacy. Suffice it to say that this case
law is undermining the concept of employment-at-will in the United States.
Specific common law tort theories of privacy are becoming recognized as
an effective countermeasure to an employer's offending inquiries. For ex-
ample, thirty states and the District of Columbia offer varying degrees of
statutory protection for employees' off-duty conduct. The statutes range
from merely protecting the rights of smokers to protecting all off-duty con-
duct that does not affect an employer's business.9 Federal statutes also ex-
9. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003) (allowing claims for lost wages
stemming from the employer's disciplining of off-duty conduct); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-402.5(1) (2003) (prohibiting action against an employee for lawful off-duty conduct,
unless that conduct is a bona fide qualification for employment); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 31-40s, 31-51q (West 2003) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
an employee for smoking or engaging in off-duty conduct protected by the U.S. Constitu-
tion); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2003) (prohibiting employers from punishing
employees for engaging in lawful off-duty activities); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01
(1997) (protecting the lawful off-duty conduct of employees that is not in direct conflict
with important employer business interests); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e)(2)
(2003)(stating that an employer may not discipline an employee for using tobacco or alcohol
products outside of the workplace).
The following states statutes prohibit an employer from infringing on an em-
ployee's right to use tobacco products outside of work: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-601.02(0
(2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1703.03 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1 (West 2003); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040(3) (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966 (West 2003);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (West 2003); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (2003); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 50-11-3 (Michie 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 500 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.315 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7.1-1.(a) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85
(Law Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
1504 (Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (2003); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(iv)
(Michie 2002).
The following states make it unlawful for an employer to punish an employee for
using lawful products off-duty: 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 1993); MINN. STAT.
§ 181.938 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.333
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tend some specific protections to prevent employers from using an em-
ployee's off-duty behavior as the basis for decisions in the workplace.
A. Common Law Tort Theories for Invasion of Privacy
There is a growing body of case law that supports the common law
tort for invasion of privacy in the context of the employer/employee rela-
tionship. The obvious limitation on such causes of action, however, is that
the protected information must truly be "private." Thus, unlike the broad
protection extended by the statutes in California, New York, North Dakota
and Colorado' which cover a wide range of off-duty conduct, such tort
theories are inherently limited to non-public information. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 652A states the general princi-
ples behind an invasion of privacy claim: that "[o]ne who invades the right
of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the in-
terests of the other."" Four distinct categories of an invasion are articu-
lated:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as
stated in § 652B; or
(b) appropriation of another's name or likeness, as stated in
§ 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life,
as stated in § 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false
light before the public, as stated in § 652E.'2
Although much has been written about the right to privacy generally'3
(Michie 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2003); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31, 111.35
(West 2003).
10. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the specific provisions governing off-duty
conduct for each of the aforementioned states).
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965).
12. Id.
13. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION
PRIVACY LAW 618-81(2003) (discussing the importance of privacy in the workplace); Julie
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy, 52 STAN. L. Rv. 1373 (2000) (calling
for increased protection of an individual's private data); Richard Posner, The Right of Pri-
vacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 394-406 (1978) (examining the economics of privacy protection);
Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 710-
29 (1987) (detailing the ways in which access to private information molds societal behav-
ior).
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and the right to privacy in the workplace specifically," much less has been
written about an employee's common law right to privacy for off-duty con-
duct.'" In the context of off-duty employee activity, two tort causes of ac-
tion are emerging as vehicles for recovery for aggrieved employees: 1) un-
reasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another and; 2) unreasonable
publicity given to another's private life. Employment cases in both of these
categories are discussed in detail below.
1. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
An increasing amount of employer-employee invasion of privacy
cases involve claims for the tort of intrusion upon solitude. The general
statement of this cause of action is found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS section 652B:
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private af-
fairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for in-
vasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person. 
6
Although employee claims for intrusion upon their seclusion can take
many forms, four general categories of complaints are beginning to
emerge: 1) sexual-related information; 2) general non-work-related per-
sonal information, such as medical and financial information; 3) issues re-
lated to the use of technology; and 4) investigations in connection with
14. See JOHN D. R. CRAIG, PRIVACY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1999) (urging that
the law should provide privacy protection for all potential and current employees); JOHN
GILLIOM, SURVEILLANCE, PRIVACY AND THE LAW: EMPLOYEE DRUG TESTING AND THE
POLITICS OF SOCIAL CONTROl (1994) (discussing ways in which employers infringe on the
privacy rights of employees through mandatory drug testing); Sharona Hoffman, Preplace-
ment Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimi-
nation in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 517 (2001) (arguing that employers should not
have access to medical information of potential employees when that information does not
relate to the employee's job); Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Em-
ployment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1996) (contending that an employer's right to
employment-at-will must be curtailed to protect employee privacy rights); Joan T.A. Gabel
& Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on the Employment Re-
lationship: An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301 (2003) (ana-
lyzing the impact of the internet on employee fights in the cyberspace workplace).
15. See generally Dworkin, supra note 5, at 48-49 (claiming that employee's ef-
forts to protect their associational rights will be slowed when society views their associa-
tions as immoral); Bosch, supra note 5, at 640 (discussing whether an employee should be
punished for conduct that harms an employer's business interest); Davidson, supra note 5, at
148 (arguing that the doctrine of respondeat superior encourages an employer to infringe
upon employee privacy fights).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652B (1965).
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workers' compensation and disability claims.
Increasingly, beginning in the early 1980s, cases have been brought
for intrusion upon solitude in connection with questions about employees'
sexual activity and orientation. For example, in Phillips v. Smalley Main-
tenance Services, plaintiff-employee Brenda Phillips was subjected to re-
peated questioning by Ray Smalley, the president and principal owner of
Smalley Maintenance Services, about her personal and intimate affairs. 7
On multiple occasions, Smalley asked Phillips to respond to invasive ques-
tions, such as how often she had sex with her husband, what "positions"
they used, and whether she had engaged in oral sex. 8 Phillips sued,
claiming that her employer wrongfully intruded into her private activities.
The Supreme Court of Alabama disagreed with the employer's attempt to
argue that there was no intrusion because Phillips "declined [Smalley's] in-
vitation and did not answer his inquiries, so no information about [Phil-
lips'] sexual experiences, practices, or inclinations was acquired or dis-
closed' . . . so as to justify the allegations of 'wrongful intrusion."" 9 The
court then held that there could be an intrusion upon seclusion "without any
requirement that information be 'acquired."' 2 Moreover, the court held
that there is no requirement under Section 652B that there be "publication"
or "communication" of the information, and there is no requirement that
the information be gathered "surreptitiously" or in a "clandestine" way.2 '
Accordingly, the court found that the facts of the case supported a claim for
wrongful intrusion into Phillips' solitude.2
Other cases have likewise upheld claims for invasion of solitude under
similar circumstances. 23 The context and nature of the inquiry, however, is
important in determining if there is an invasion of privacy. The central
question is whether the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person. For example, in one context a court found that a co-worker's iso-
lated question, "Are you gay?" made in private, at a firm retreat, was
"not... highly offensive to a reasonable person" given that it was asked in
the context of determining plaintiff's "overall job satisfaction and comfort
17. Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 706-07 (Ala. 1983).
18. Id. at 707.
19. Id. at 709.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 709-10.
22. Id. at711.
23. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Dabbs, 703 So. 2d 979, 981-82 (Ala. Civ. App.
1997) (involving a plaintiff who was subjected to sexual harassment, which included "im-
proper inquiries into her personal sexual proclivities" and who was fired after her employer
learned that she was getting married); Busby v. Truswal Sys. Corp., 551 So. 2d 322, 324
(Ala. 1989) (precluding summary judgment in favor of the employer on an invasion of pri-
vacy claim after finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a plant
supervisor intruded into plaintiffs' sex lives in an offensive and objectionable manner).
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of living in the south."'
A second context in which privacy claims for wrongful intrusion upon
seclusion might be brought involves an employer gathering general non-
work related information about employees. For example, in a rather un-
usual case, an employer used undercover investigative personnel to gather
non-work related information. 2 In Johnson v. K Mart Corp., fifty-five cur-
rent and former employees of K-Mart brought claims for invasion of pri-
vacy based upon unauthorized intrusion upon their seclusion. 6 K Mart
hired Confidential Investigative Consultants, Inc. (CIC) to provide security
services at one of K Mart's distribution centers, in response to problems
with theft, vandalism, sabotage, and potential drug use. 7 CIC placed two
undercover workers at the center; one posed as a janitor and the other posed
as an employee in the repack department.2 ' The investigators regularly
submitted handwritten reports about events they observed and conversa-
tions they participated in or overheard both at work, and outside the work-
place at social gatherings.29 The court found that "the means used by [the]
defendant to induce plaintiffs to reveal this information were deceptive....
Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that their conversations with 'co-
workers' would remain private, at least to the extent that intimate life de-
tails would not be published to their employer."30 K Mart admitted that it
had "no business purpose for gathering information about employees' per-
sonal lives" and the court found that K Mart "never instructed the investi-
gators to change their practices or to stop including the highly personal in-
formation in their reports."3' Accordingly, the court found that a "material
issue of fact exist[ed] regarding whether a reasonable person would have
found [K Mart's] actions to be an ... objectionable intrusion. 32
The Johnson case is somewhat unusual due to the clandestine means
used by the employer to learn about its employees. If the information gath-
ered is less invasive and the employer has some basis for assembling the
information, then a court may find that there is no invasion of privacy. For
24. Morenz v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 79979, 2002 WL 1041760, at *4
(Ohio Ct. App. May 23, 2002).
25. Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192 (I11. App. Ct. 2000).
26. Id. at 1194.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 1194, 1196 (describing the investigation); Id. at 1194. The reports
contained information about the employees' off-duty activities and conduct including but
not limited to: employee family matters (the criminal conduct of children, incidents of do-
mestic violence and impending divorces); romantic interests/sex lives (sexual conduct of
employees in terms of number/gender of sexual partners); and personal matters and private
concerns (prostate problems, paternity issues, characterizations about other employees'
drinking).
30. Id. at 1196.
31. Id. at 1197.
32. Id.
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example, in another case, the mere presence in an employee's personnel
file of her bank statement and certain diary entries communicated to her
psychiatrist were not sufficient to state a cause of action for invasion of
3privacy. Likewise, where an employer's investigation of an employee's
conduct was limited to interviews of the full-time employees, examination
of company records, and review of material voluntarily produced by the
employee, there was no expectation of privacy to support a claim of intru-
sion upon seclusion.34
A third employment-related context pertains to an employee's reason-
able expectation of privacy with regard to technology." Several notewor-
thy cases have addressed this issue. One of the most well-known, Smyth v.
Pillsbury Co., tangentially involves off-duty conduct.36 In this case, the
plaintiff received certain e-mail communications on his home computer
from his supervisor over the employer's e-mail system.37 Despite assur-
ances that e-mails were confidential, the employer intercepted the plain-
tiffs private e-mail messages and terminated him for transmitting "inap-
propriate and unprofessional comments" over the e-mail system." The
court stated that it did not find a "reasonable expectation of privacy in e-
mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor
over the company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such
communications would not be intercepted by management."39 The fact that
Smyth was at home using his own computer was immaterial to the court.
The company's interest in preventing employees from using its e-mail sys-
tem in an inappropriate and unprofessional way outweighed any reasonable
expectation of privacy, even though this was contrary to its assertions that
e-mail would remain confidential and privileged"
Smyth seems to have set the general tone for subsequent cases; when
an employee is using workplace systems-even if the use is off-site --
33. See, e.g., Robyn v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 774 F. Supp. 587, 592-93
(D. Colo. 1991) (explaining that the employee did not have a cause of action for an
invasion of privacy because there was no evidence that her employer improperly
obtained this information).
34. See, e.g., Rogers v. IBM Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(finding the employee did not have a claim for invasion of privacy).
35. See Michael S. Leib, E-Mail and the Wiretap Laws: Why Congress Should
Add Electronic Communication to Title III's Statutory Exclusionary Rule and Expressly
Reject a "Good Faith" Exception, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393 (1997) (discussing an em-
ployee's reasonable expectation of privacy regarding e-mail and its relationship to the
Wiretap Laws).
36. Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
37. Id. at 98.
38. Id. at 98-99. The e-mails allegedly concerned "sales management and con-
tained threats to 'kill the backstabbing bastards' and referred to the planned Holiday party as
the 'Jim Jones Koolaid affair."' Id. at 98 n. 1.
39. Id. at 101.
40. Id.
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there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.' If an employer has an an-
nounced policy that it may monitor electronic and telephone equipment, an
employee is not likely to have an actionable claim for invasion of privacy.
One court even went so far as to find that an employee who was in the pri-
vacy of her home using her own phone and engaged in a personal phone
call, did not sufficiently state a claim for "intrusion" after her employer
used information intercepted on a radio scanner. 2 In that case, based on the
intercepted information, the plaintiff-employee was accused of misconduct
and received a warning that she should "'limit her conversations regarding
personal situations with [bank] personnel as well as customers."'43 Each of
these cases indicate that employees who use electronic devices have a di-
minished expectation of privacy, especially when the use involves commu-
nications about the employer.
The other type of claims commonly brought against employers for in-
trusion upon seclusion concerns investigations of employees who are dis-
abled or out of work because of some kind of illness or injury. In such
cases, there seems to be a diminished right of privacy for employees. For
example, in Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., the plaintiff alleged two counts
of invasion upon seclusion or solitude after his employer hired a private in-
vestigator to determine the extent of the plaintiffs injuries, based upon a
suspicion of malingering." Although the plaintiff could show that the in-
vestigator's act of entering his home under false pretenses and peering
through his windows with a powerful camera lens did constitute an "intru-
sion," the court found that the intrusions were not focused towards "matters
which plaintiff had a right to keep private." '  The employer had a
"right... to engage in investigation of an employee" and the plaintiffs
privacy was "subject to the legitimate interest of his employer in investi-
gating suspicions that plaintiffs work-related disability was a pretext."
As such, the employee did not have a claim for intrusion upon solitude. A
similar result was reached in Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, in which the
plaintiff-employee Thomas Schmidt lied to Ameritech Illinois (Ameritech)
at least three times about going on a fishing trip while he was on disability
41. See generally Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-
12143-RWZ, 2002 WL 974676, at *4 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002) (holding that employees had
no reasonable expectation of privacy in using their employer's e-mail system); TBG Ins.
Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 445 (2002) (concluding that the plain-
tiff-employee who signed an "'electronic and telephone equipment policy statement"' and
agreed in writing that his employer could monitor his computers "had no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when he used the home computer for personal matters").
42. Karch v. BayBank FSB, 794 A.2d 763, 773 (N.H. 2002).
43. Id. at 769 (alteration in original).
44. Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
45. Id. at 384.
46. Id.
2004]
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 6:3
leave for an injury unconnected with his employment. 7 Suspicious about
Schmidt's activity while out on disability, Ameritech launched an investi-
gation. Schmidt contended that his employer's examination and use of his
personal telephone records constituted an "'unreasonable intrusion upon
seclusion.' '4' After a jury returned a verdict in Schmidt's favor, including
the imposition of five million dollars in punitive damages, Ameritech ap-
pealed.4 '9 The appeals court found that "to succeed in adequately pleading
and proving a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the intrusion is not only offensive, but
highly offensive to a reasonable person."5 Based on its assessment that
Schmidt lost his job because he lied, not because Ameritech intruded upon
his seclusion, the court found that the jury's verdict was "against the mani-
fest weight of the evidence."'"
Likewise, in York v. General Electric Co., an employee receiving
workers' compensation benefits unsuccessfully claimed that his employer's
investigation constituted an invasion of privacy under section 652B of the
Restatement of Torts Second. 2 In that case, John York was videotaped
from across the street going to the chiropractor's office, visiting a lawn-
mower repair shop, working in the yard, riding a motorcycle, and mowing
the grass.53 After viewing the tape, York's employer decided to contest the
payment of chiropractor treatments. 4 The court held that there was no in-
vasion of privacy, because "[a]ll of the scenes on the video were outside
and in public view."55 Acknowledging that "the filing of a workers' com-
pensation claim does not justify an investigation that constitutes an inva-
sion of privacy," the court nonetheless underscored the fact that "[i]t is not
unreasonable for an employer to conduct an investigation into a person's
injury while the person is receiving workers' compensation benefits as long
,,56
as the investigation does not amount to an invasion of workers privacy.
47. Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 768 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
Ameritech had a disability policy which provided that "taking a vacation while also col-
lecting disability is prohibited without written authorization." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 309.
50. Id. at 312.
51. Id. at 318.
52. York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
53. Id. at 866.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 868.
56. Id. (citing Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468, 474 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (finding violation of privacy right where employer searched the hotel room of an em-
ployee even though the employer paid for the room) and Weimer v. Youngstown Steel Door
Co., No.82 C.A. 81, 1983 WL 6718, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 26, 1983) (concluding that a
reasonable investigation into injuries is expected when an employee files a workers' com-
pensation claim). Accord ICU Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 70 So. 2d 685, 689-90 (Ala.
2000) (holding that an employee did not state a cause of action for intrusion when a com-
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Thus, if an employer is legitimately investigating the status of an em-
ployee who is out of work due to illness or injury, and that observation
does not involve the use of any invasive equipment, courts are not inclined
to allow invasion of privacy claims.
2. Publicizing Private Facts
In addition to claims for intrusions upon solitude, employees are also
increasingly bringing tort invasion of privacy claims against their employ-
ers for publicizing private facts. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 652D,
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for inva-
sion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public 7
As a threshold for determining actionable behavior, the disclosure
must be of private matters. That is, matters concerning the "private, as dis-
tinguished from the public, life of the individual."58 Thus, "[t]here is no li-
ability [when an employer] merely gives further publicity to information
about the [employee] that is already public" or "for giving further publicity
to what the [employee] himself leaves open to the public eye., 5 9 Moreover,
there must be "publicity" of the private fact, meaning "communicating it to
the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded
as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. '' 0 Thus, the
requirement of publicity is distinguished from "publication," which in-
cludes any communication to a third person, in to establishing defamation
liability. Also, unlike a claim for defamation, tort liability under this sec-
tion can attach even if the statements are true.6 1
In the employment context, claims for intrusion upon seclusion and
public disclosure of private facts often go hand-in-hand, as was the case in
621
both Johnson v. K Mart Corp.62 and Karch v. BayBank FSB.63 In Johnson,
pany videotaped him in his front yard for over an 1l-day period as part of his employer's
investigation into his workers' compensation claim).
57. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1965).
58. Id. at cmt. b.
59. Id.
60. Id. at cmt. a.
61. Id. at Special Note on Relation to § 652D to the First Amendment to
the Constitution.
62. 723 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
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current and former employees of K Mart contended that their employer was
liable for the publication of private facts when it deceptively gathered in-
formation about their family matters, health problems and sex lives." Con-
cluding that such matters were "clearly private," the court then considered
whether the publicity requirement of the tort was met, holding that "the
public disclosure requirement may be satisfied by proof that the plaintiff
has a special relationship with the 'public' to whom the information is dis-
closed. 65 In other words, disclosure to a limited audience is actionable if
there is a "'special relationship ... between the plaintiff and the "public"' -
such as employers or other employees - to whom the information is dis-
closed.6 Accordingly, the court found that "personal details about plain-
tiffs' private lives [that] were disclosed to their employer by the investiga-
tors" raised a genuine issue as to whether publicity was given to private
facts, thereby precluding summary judgment.67
A similar result was reached in Karch, where plaintiff's employer sur-
reptitiously used a scanner to listen to her at-home phone conversation.'
With regard to the publicity requirement, it is important to note that a de-
termination as to "whether a disclosure of a private matter has become one
of 'public knowledge' does not... [necessarily] depend on the number of
people told., 69 The employer's disclosure to a few other employees can be
sufficient to permit recovery for public disclosure of private facts.0 Thus,
it is not necessary to have a wide audience for the disclosure to be action-
able.
A growing area in the tort of publicizing private facts is in the context
of sexual orientation.7' The "outing" of gay employees can clearly pre-
cipitate privacy-based law suits. One of the first such cases was
Greenwood v. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, involving an attorney, Scott
Greenwood, who filed a lawsuit alleging that he was fired from the Taft,
63. 794 A.2d 763 (N.H. 2002). See supra Part H.A. 1. for a discussion of the in-
trusion upon seclusion claims.
64. Johnson, 723 N.E.2d at 1197.
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d
900, 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)).
67. Johnson, 723 N.E.2d at 1197.
68. Karch, 794 A.2d at 768.
69. Id. at 774.
70. Id.
71. See generally Barbara Moretti, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion
of Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosures of Sexual Orientation, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857, 861 (1993) (arguing that "when disclosures of sexual ori-
entation are unrelated to any issue before the public... they are unwarranted and unjustified
invasions of privacy" by the media); Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the
Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Juris-
prudence, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 119 (2003) (discussing various causes of action surround-
ing homosexuality disclosures).
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Stettinius & Hollister law firm (the Taft firm) because he is gay and did pro
bono work in favor of the Human Rights Ordinance of the City of Cincin-
nati.72 Among other things, Greenwood alleged that his right to privacy
was violated when the firm disseminated private information about his
male partner.73 Specifically, he alleged that after he amended his employee
benefit forms to list his male partner as a beneficiary, his employer shared
this information "'with persons who had no responsibility for the admini-
stration of the benefits programs and no need to know the information."'7
Inasmuch as the Taft firm did not dispute the fact that sexual orientation is
private information, the issue before the court was to determine if the dis-
closure was "public."75 Refusing to dismiss Greenwood's claim, the court
concluded that Greenwood's allegations that the information was shared
"with persons who had no responsibility for the administration of the bene-
fit programs and no need to know the information" and that "the Taft firm
disclosed confidential information about him without privilege to do so"
were sufficient to state a claim.76 The Greenwood case is important be-
cause it recognizes that sexual orientation is a private fact and limited dis-
closure can be sufficient to trigger liability.
In another case, Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez (heard en banc by the
Supreme Court of Colorado) plaintiff Robert Borquez brought an action in
tort based on the unreasonable publicity given to his sexual orientation.77
Similar to the Greenwood case, the court recognized the tort of unreason-
able publicity in the context of outing a gay employee. When Borquez,
who is homosexual, learned that his partner was diagnosed with AIDS, he
telephoned his secretary attempting to arrange to have a colleague cover a
deposition and an arbitration for him.78 In the course of making those ar-
rangements, Borquez subsequently disclosed his situation to Robert Ozer,
the president of the law firm.79 Ozer, in turn, disclosed the information to
his wife, the law firm's office manager, and two secretaries.8" This case is
important for its recognition of the tort of invasion of privacy based on un-
reasonable publicity given to one's private life and its articulation of the
elements necessary to prove such a claim. Those elements include:
72. 663 N.E.2d 1030, 1031 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1035.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1035-36.
77. 940 P.2d 371, 373 (Colo. 1997) (en banc).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 374.
80. Id.
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1) the fact or facts disclosed must be private in nature; 2)
the disclosure must be made to the public; 3) the disclosure
must be one which would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person; 4) the facts or facts disclosed cannot be of le-
gitimate concern to the public; and 5) the defendant acted
with reckless disregard of the private nature of the fact or
facts disclosed.8
With regard to the first element, the court found that "facts related to
an individual's sexual relations, or 'unpleasant or disgraceful' illnesses, are
considered private in nature and the disclosure of such facts constitutes an
invasion of the individual's right to privacy."' Ostensibly, this element
would include disclosures about sexual orientation, as well as AIDS. Un-
fortunately for the plaintiff, however, because the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury regarding the term "publicity," confusing it with mere
"publication," the verdict in favor of Borquez was thrown out.83 Neverthe-
less, the Ozer case lays the ground work for similar suits that could be
brought by gay employees for public disclosure of sexual orientation.
B. State Statutory Protection of Off-Duty Conduct
There are two basic types of state statutes pertaining to an employee's
off-duty conduct. The first category deals with the lawful use of consum-
able products, including tobacco. The second category pertains to other
lawful off-duty conduct. The latter statutes run the range from California's
very broad wording, to a narrower focus in Connecticut where private em-
ployees' First Amendment rights are protected against violations by their
employers. The provisions of these statutes and the cases interpreting their
scope are discussed below. Although in most circumstances a person's
marital status is not considered to be a "private" fact, to the extent that
marital status relates to off-duty behavior, it should also be mentioned that
many state statutes protect marital status, preventing discrimination based
on whether a person is married or unmarried.M
81. Id. at 377.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 379.
84. The following statutes have declared marital status discrimination il-
legal. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 711 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §
7051(2) (West 2003); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
363A.08 (West 2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §
296(1)(a) (2003); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 2003). This list is not in-
tended to be exhaustive; it is merely intended to illustrate examples of such stat-
utes. One statute even disclosed that discrimination based on marital status is a
threat to the state and its citizens. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200 (Michie 2002). See
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1. Lawful Use of Consumable Products, Including Tobacco
The first wave of protection for employees off the job came in the
early 1990s in the form of legislation primarily intended to protect smokers
from discrimination at work.8" Some laws exclusively pertain to "tobacco
products, 86 but many contain broad wording to protect employees who use
"lawful products."87  Such laws drew strong support from such diverse
groups as the American Civil Liberties Union, organized labor, the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Fat Acceptance, the American
Motorcycle Association, and the tobacco industry. One of the first such
statutes was appropriately enacted in Virginia, 8 where in the seventeenth
century colonist John Rolfe began a tobacco industry that continues to this
day. The Virginia statute provides that no employee or applicant for em-
ployment with the Commonwealth "shall be required, as a condition of
employment, to smoke or use tobacco products on the job, or to abstain
from smoking or using tobacco products outside the course of his employ-
ment.... ,89 The statute does not apply to firefighters and members of po-
lice departments.9 This statute is distinguishable from other such statutes
by its very limited scope, applying only to employees and applicants for
positions with the Commonwealth of Virginia.
also Dworkin, supra note 5, at 56 (discussing discrimination on the basis of marital
status in the context of associational privacy).
85. See Lewis L. Maltby & Bernard J. Dushman, Whose Life is it Anyway--Em-
ployer Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 645, 646 (1994) (argu-
ing that legislation is necessary to prevent "unwarranted employer intrusion into the private
lives and private choices of employees, especially regarding the decision whether to
smoke.").
86. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-601.02 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40s
(West 2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1703.03 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-5-4-1 (West
2003); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Michie 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966
(West 2003); ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (West 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33
(2003); Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.145 (2003); N.J. STAT ANN. § 34:6B-1 (West 2003); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 50-11-3 (Michie 2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 500 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.315 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7-1 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law.
Co-op. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504
(Michie 2003); W. VA. CODE § 21-3-19 (2003); WyO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(iv) (Mi-
chie 2002).
87. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/5-5 (1993); MINN. STAT. § 181.938 (2003);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-28.2(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e) (2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31
(West 2003).
88. The original statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-29.18 (Michie 1989) was re-
pealed in 1997 by VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504 (Michie 2003). The provisions remain the
same.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1504 (Michie 2003).
90. Id. Classes of employees excluded from the statute are located in VA. CODE
ANN. § 27-40.1 and § 51.1-813 (Michie 2003).
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An example of a much more comprehensive statute is the law enacted
in North Carolina,9' the home state of tobacco company R. J. Reynolds.
This statute, which applies to public and private employers with three or
more regularly employed employees,9 reflects a compromise between the
employees' rights to use lawful products and the employers' desire to con-
trol off-duty behavior that could affect their organizations. The North
Carolina statute provides that it is an:
unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire a prospective employee, or discharge or oth-
erwise discriminate against any employee with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment because the prospective employee or the employee
engages in or has engaged in the lawful use of lawful
products if the activity occurs off the premises of the em-
ployer during nonworking hours .... 9'
The use of lawful products, however, is not wholly unfettered; the use
of such products must "not adversely affect the employee's job perform-
ance or the person's ability to properly fulfill the responsibilities of the po-
sition in question or the safety of other employees." 94 Moreover, it is not a
violation for an employer to restrict the normal use of lawful products by
employees during non-working hours "if the restriction relates to a bona
fide occupational requirement and is reasonably related to the employment
activities" or "if the restriction relates to the fundamental objectives of the
organization." 95 If an employee fails to comply with the requirements of
the employer's substance abuse prevention program, the employer may
discharge, discipline, or take any action against the employee as the result
of that failure.' The North Carolina statute also does not prohibit an em-
ployer from distinguishing between employees based on the use or nonuse
of lawful products in connection with health, disability and life insurance
policies.97 Lastly, the statute provides a private cause of action for ag-
grieved employees and prospective employees who are entitled to seek lost
wages and benefits, as well as reinstatement or hiring. 9 The prevailing
party may also be awarded reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. 99 Through
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2003).
92. See id. § 95-28.2(a).
93. See id. § 95-28.2(b).
94. Id.
95. See id. § 95-28.2(c)(1)-(2).
96. See id. § 95-28.2(c)(3).
97. See id. § 95-28.2(d).
98. See id. § 95-28.2(e)(1)-(3).
99. See id. § 95-28.2(0.
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these provisions, the North Carolina statute protects employees who use
lawful products when they are not at work, and it also protects employers
from any use that could be detrimental to their business.
Most statutes prohibiting discrimination related to off-duty use of law-
ful products have been on the books for the last decade, yet there has been
very little case law interpreting their language. In fact, a search of all of the
statutes prohibiting discrimination for the use of tobacco and other lawful
products produced only a few cases. The first involves Minnesota's law
that prohibits employers from taking adverse employment action because
an employee or applicant for employment "engages in or has engaged in
the use or enjoyment of lawful consumable products, if the use or enjoy-
ment takes place off the premises of the employer during nonworking
hours."'" The Minnesota statute specifically includes alcoholic beverages
as a "lawful consumable product[]."'' In Miners v. Cargill Communica-
tions, Inc., the plaintiff-employee attempted to argue that her employer
violated Minnesota's non-work activities statute when it terminated her for
consuming alcohol during non-working hours.' 2 The plaintiff, Miners,
who worked as a promotions director for a radio station owned by Cargill,
was responsible for organizing the radio station's promotional events at
various locations, including nightclubs and bars.' 3 Suspicious that Miners
was drinking alcohol prior to driving the company van, management hired
a private investigator to follow her." Thereafter, the investigator observed
Miners drinking alcoholic beverages at several bars, then driving away in
the company van.' 5 Two days later, after the investigator observed Miners
again consuming alcohol at several bars, he tipped off Miners's supervisor,
who met Miners at the van and demanded the keys to prevent her from
driving away.'° Miners, who was approximately 250 pounds, admitted that
she drank five alcoholic beverages over the course of a six-hour period.' 7
100. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938(2) (West 2003).
101. Id.
102. Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., No. C8-97-837, 1997 WL 757157,
at * 3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997). Note the procedural history of this case. Miners
originally filed both federal and state employment discrimination claims in federal district
court, which granted summary judgment on the federal claim in favor of the employer and
refused to authorize supplemental jurisdiction on the state claim. Id. at *1. Miners appealed
the disposition of the state law claims in the Minnesota Court of Appeals and appealed the
federal claims to the Eighth Circuit. Id. See also Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc.,
113 F.3d 820,825 (8th Cir. 1997) (reversing the granting of summary judgment in favor of
Cargill for both Miner's federal Americans with Disabilities Act claim and her state Minne-
sota Human Rights Act claim).
103. Miners, 113 F.3d at 821.
104. Id. at 822. It is unclear from the facts of the case whether Minor was "off-
duty" when she was allegedly drinking and then driving the company van.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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The next day Miners was fired. ,08 Miners claimed in her charges to federal
and state employment discrimination agencies that Cargill told her "she
was terminated for driving a company van while intoxicated."' ' Finding
that the record contained no evidence to factually support Miners' claim
that her employer violated the statute, and that the statute "contains no pro-
hibition against an employer terminating an employee for driving a com-
pany vehicle after consuming alcohol," the court affirmed summary judg-
ment dismissing the statutory claim. "° It should be noted that, even though
the court did not point to it, the Minnesota statute contains provisions per-
mitting an employer to restrict the use of lawful consumable products if it
"is reasonably related to employment activities or responsibilities" of the
employee."' In this case, the employer could also have argued that its em-
ployee's consumption of alcohol unreasonably interfered with her respon-
sibilities to the company and, in fact, could have potentially subjected the
company to liability. The fact that she was driving a company van essen-
tially removed the plaintiff from the protection of the statute.
The second case, Wood v. South Dakota Cement Plant,' 2 tested the
scope of South Dakota's statute, which makes it a discriminatory or unfair
employment practice for an employer to terminate an employee based on
that employee's use of tobacco products off the employer's premises dur-
ing non-working hours."3 Under the statute, the right to use tobacco prod-
ucts is subject to restrictions. An employer may restrict the use if: 1) the
restriction "[r]elates to a bona fide occupational qualification and is rea-
sonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsi-
bilities of a particular employee or a particular group of employees," or 2)
the restriction is "necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any respon-
sibilities to the employer or the appearance of such a conflict of interest.'1
4
In the Wood case, Charles Wood was offered a position with South Dakota
Cement Plant, but the offer was conditioned upon his agreement to stop
smoking."5 This employment condition was prompted by a physical ex-
amination that revealed a mass in his lung." 6 Based upon that report,
Wood's twenty years of smoking and the fact that the position would ex-
108. Id. Before firing her, Cargill apparently gave her the option of either enter-
ing a rehabilitation program or losing her job. Id. Upon refusing treatment, she was fired.
Id.
109. Miners, 1997 WL 757157, at *3.
110. Id. The court reversed summary judgment that dismissed the breach of
contract claim. Id.
111. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938(3)(1) (West 2003).
112. 588 N.W.2d 227 (S.D. 1999).
113. Id. at 230. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (Michie 2003) (contains
the actual statutory provision).
114. Id. at § 60-4-11.
115. Wood, 588 N.W.2d at 228.
116. Id.
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pose him to dust, the employer insisted that Wood quit smoking."17 Wood
agreed to quit smoking, but tests later revealed nicotine in his system, and
he was fired."8 Wood claimed that his employer violated South Dakota's
off-duty use of tobacco law and sought damages for lost wages." 9 Reject-
ing his claim, the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the smoking
restriction placed on Wood was related to a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation and "was reasonably and rationally related" to the employment re-
sponsibilities of the position.' This determination was based on medical
testimony about the potential added hazard of dust in the job area which
could ultimately subject the employer to liability for Wood's illness. 2,
The third case, McGillen v. Plum Creek Timber Co., involved a rather
novel attempt to seek refuge under a "lawful product" statute in Montana.'22
Under Montana law, an employer "may not discriminate against an indi-
vidual with respect to compensation, promotion, or the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because the individual legally uses a lawful
product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours.' 23 Plaintiff
Jerry McGillen, who worked at Plum Creek Manufacturing (Plum Creek)
for approximately fifteen years, was reported by his supervisor, John
DeReu, for sleeping on the job.24 After he was suspended, McGillen ap-
parently decided to play a practical joke on DeReu by placing an ad in the
Mountain Trader, a weekly trade publication.2 5 The ad indicated that per-
sons interested in purchasing a certain truck should call DeRue late in the
evening. 6 After Plum Creek hired an investigator, McGillen admitted that
he placed the ad, and was terminated.'27 In his action for wrongful termi-
nation, McGillen argued that his use of a "lawful product" - the Mountain
Trader - could not be a legitimate business reason for his discharge.'28 In
response, Plum Creek argued that because McGillen admitted that he had
violated company policy, it had good cause to fire him. 29 Denying both
parties' motions for summary judgment, the court let the case be heard by a
jury. In the context of jury instructions, the trial court noted that "lawful
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 231.
121. Id. at 230.
122. McGillen v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 964 P.2d 18 (Mont. 1998).
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(2) (2003).
124. McGillen, 964 P.2d at 20.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 23 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5), which provides that "[t]he
legal use of a lawful product by an individual off of the employer's premises during non-
working hours is not a legitimate business reason" for dismissal of an employee unless the
employer acts within the provisions of MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313).
129. Id. at21. 23.
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product" as defined by section 39-2-213 of the Montana Code "means a
product that is legally consumed, and includes food, beverages, and to-
bacco" - not placing an ad in a newspaper. 30  The Supreme Court of
Montana agreed with the trial court, underscoring that the purpose of the
statute is to "protect an employee from discharge for the use of a legal
product, such as alcohol or tobacco, off the employer's premises."'3 ' In so
doing, the court circumscribed the scope of "lawful product" to those prod-
ucts that can literally be consumed.
2. Other Lawful Off-Duty Conduct
Several states have adopted laws that are much more comprehensive.
California, New York, North Dakota and Colorado all have statutes that
protect a broader range of activity.' Massachusetts also has a right to pri-
vacy statute that extends protection to employees for off-duty conduct, 
33
and Connecticut protects employees who exercise certain federal and state
constitutional rights from adverse action by their employers.' 34 The rele-
vant law in each of these states is discussed herein, including recent cases
interpreting the scope of each.
a. Califomia
In addition to the right to privacy contained in the state constitution,'
35
California has a separate law pertaining to a worker's right to privacy for
off-duty conduct. The plain language of California's law governing an
employer's use of off-duty conduct has the potential to be the most exten-
sive law in the nation. Under section 96(k) of California's Labor Code, the
Labor Commissioner is required to take assignment of "[c]laims for loss of
wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from employ-
130. Id. at 23-24.
131. Id. at 24.
132. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003) (protecting all "lawful conduct"
occurring off the employer's premises during nonworking hours); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-
34-402.5 (2003) (protecting all lawful activity done after work and off the employer's
premises); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201d(2) (McKinney 2003) (prohibiting adverse employment
decisions based on an employee's off-duty recreational activities and lawful use of consum-
able products); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2003) (prohibiting discrimination based on
lawful off-duty activity).
133. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § lB (Law. Co-op. 2003) (providing a gen-
eral right to privacy to all individuals). The case notes following the statute list examples in
which the Massachusetts courts have applied the statute.
134. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2003).
135. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (providing that "[a]ll people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.").
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ment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away from the
employer's premises."' 3 6  This law, which became effective January 1,
2000, originally only applied to current employees; it now applies to both
employees and job applicants.'37 In 2001, the California legislature ex-
tended protection to applicants after it found and declared that
absent the protections by the Labor Commissioner, work-
ing men and women are ill-equipped and unduly disad-
vantaged in any effort to assert their individual rights oth-
erwise protected by the Labor Code. The Legislature finds
it necessary and appropriate to provide employees an inex-
pensive administrative remedy for their pursuit of their
rights under the Labor Code. The Legislature further de-
clares that this act is necessary to further the state interest
in protecting the rights of individual employees and job
applicants who could not otherwise afford to protect them-
selves. '
Rather surprisingly, this section of the California Labor Code does not
contain any exceptions, like those contained in similar statutes in New
York, North Dakota and Colorado. 39 For example, under the plain lan-
guage of section 96(k), there is no exception to accommodate an em-
ployer's business necessity or conflicts of interest. ' ° Not surprisingly, im-
mediately after its enactment, concerns arose about the scope of the statute
and the ramifications for employers in California.1
4
136. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003).
137. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West 2003) (stating that "[n]o person shall dis-
charge an employee or in any manner discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because the employee or applicant engaged in any conduct ... described in
subdivision (k) of Section 96").
138. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 note (West 2003) (historical and statutory notes).
139. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003) (broadly granting the Labor
Commissioner authority to take assignments of claims for loss of wages as a result of dis-
charge for "lawful conduct during nonworking hours away from employer's premises"),
with N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 2003) (proscribing the off-duty conduct that an
employer may not use as the basis for employment decisions and giving limited exceptions
to that rule), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2003) (providing a business-related inter-
est exception to the anti-discrimination law), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a)-(b)
(2003) (providing exceptions to the law against termination of off-duty employee activities).
The New York, North Dakota, and Colorado statutes are discussed in more depth infra in
Part II.B.2.b-d.
140. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003) (failing to mention either of
these exceptions).
141. See Michelle R. Barrett, "Lawful Conduct" In Amended California Code §
96: "Lifestyle Discrimination" Provision or Restatement of Civil Liberties Protection?,
A.S.A.P. (Littler Mendelson, San Francisco, C.A.), Dec. 1999, available at
http://www.littler.com/nwsltr/asap-lawfulconduct.html (discussing potential implications
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With many questions raised about the breadth of section 96(k), the
California Attorney General was asked to determine if the statute abrogated
existing law that "permits the disciplining of peace officers for off-duty
conduct occurring away from their place of employment that is otherwise
lawful but conflicts with their duties as peace officers.' 4'  The California
Attorney General held that it did not abrogate existing law which prevented
peace officers from participating in off-duty conduct that conflicted with
their job duties. 43 Although this opinion does not apply to private employ-
ers, it does contain language that has set the tone for subsequent interpreta-
tions. The opinion acknowledged that subsection (k) was added to section
96 "so that the Commissioner could 'assert the civil rights otherwise guar-
anteed by Article I of the California Constitution' for employees 'ill-
equipped and unduly disadvantaged' to assert such rights."'" Importantly,
the California Attorney General observed that the constitutional rights of
peace officers "do not prevent [them] from being disciplined for off-duty
incompatible activities.' 45  Moreover, throughout its history, section 96
"has not served as an original source of employee rights against employers,
but has instead provided a supplemental procedure for asserting employee
claims for which the legal basis already existed elsewhere in the law."'
46
This history of section 96 led to the conclusion that the addition of subsec-
tion (k) to section 96 "did not create new substantive rights for employ-
ees .... it established a procedural mechanism that allows the Commis-
sioner to assert, on behalf of employees, their independently recognized
constitutional rights.' 4 7 In so doing, the California Attorney General po-
tentially limited the scope of off-duty behavior protected by section 96(k).
To date, two cases have been decided in California regarding the
of section 96(k) on employers' policies and practices); Section 96(k) of the California Labor
Code: Implications for Employers Who Attempt to Regulate Lawful Employee Conduct
During Non-Working Hours, THELEN REID REPORT No. 63 (Thelen Reid & Priest LLP),
June 18, 2002 at http://www.thelenreid.comarticles/report/rep63.htm (describing the poten-
tial problems that section 96(k) might cause employers). Both of these e-newsletters written
by large management law firms express concern about the liability sections 96(k) and 98.6
create for employers in California.
142. 83 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 226 (2000) available at 2000 WL 1514816
(Cal.A.G.). Article I of the California Constitution establishes a range of civil rights, in-
cluding "liberty of speech and of the press, right to assemble and to petition, and religious
freedom." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *228 (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k), ch. 4, 1999 Cal. Stats. ch. 92 §
1).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 229. This opinion served as the basis for rejecting a police officer's
argument that his employer "impermissibly relied on off-duty conduct in terminating his
employment." Paloma v. City of Newark, No. A8098022, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
371, at *35-39 (Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2003).
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scope of section 96(k) in the context of private employment. 48 Both of
these cases involve an employee's associational interests. In the first case,
Tavani v. Levi Strauss & Co., Vincent Tavani sued his former employer
for, inter alia, violating his rights protected by section 96(k). 4 9 Tavani, a
high-ranking manager, was terminated as the result of his inappropriate re-
lationships with subordinate women at Levi Strauss & Co. (Levi), which
deteriorated confidence in his leadership and his "ability to manage effec-
tively."' '0 Prior to being terminated, Tavani received a written warning that
he "maintained an inappropriate personal relationship with a subordinate"
which "violated [Levi's] Conflict of Interest policy and exposed the com-
pany to a claim which had to be settled."'' Levi's policy requires its em-
ployees to avoid conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflicts of inter-
est, and admonishes employees that the "standards of policy application for
conflicts of interest are higher for employees at higher levels in the organi-
zation due to the scope of their responsibilities."'52 Despite that warning,
Tavani engaged in a subsequent relationship with another Levi employee.'13
The court was not persuaded by Tavani's assertion that his behavior
should be protected by section 96(k). Instead of giving the statute a broad
interpretation, the court stated that California courts have "consistently
stressed" that "the right to privacy is not absolute."'54 Tavani's alleged ro-
mantic relationships "may have occurred outside Levi's premises but [they]
diminished [his] credibility and effectiveness as a manager at Levi.' 5 The
court found that termination of Taviani's employment would only be "an
invasion of privacy if it were based on the 'misuse' of private informa-
tion."'56 The court continued to explain why Tavani's off-duty conduct was
not protected by section 96(k):
148. See Tavani v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. A095770, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 10794, at *52 (Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2002) (ruling that the employer could terminate the
employee for his relationships with subordinate female employees because it affected his
ability to be a good upper level manager); Agabao v. Delta Design, Inc., No. D039642, 2003
WL 194950, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2003) (concluding that as an exception to section
96(k) an employer's legitimate business interests could be used to relinquish employee
rights that would otherwise be protected by the statute).
149. See Tavani, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 10794, at *43.
150. Id. at *15.
151. Id. at *6-7 (alteration in original).
152. Id. at *32.
153. See id. at *12-13 (describing Tavani's second relationship with a subordinate
female employee).
154. Id. at *44.
155. Id. at *44-45.
156. Id. at 45.
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Tavani had a diminished expectation of privacy regarding
his relationships with female subordinate employees and
his actions created a situation that required Levi to become
concerned about his "inappropriate" relationships. Not
only did his actions influence his effectiveness as an upper
level manager in the company but, once Levi became
aware that his staff and former employees were claiming
his personal relationship affected his employment deci-
sions, it had an obligation to both investigate and take
proper remedial action.'57
The fact that Tavani's effectiveness as a Levi employee was under-
mined by his relationships was a persuasive factor for the court. Thus,
even though section 96(k) does not contain a conflicts of interest exception
for employers, one was effectively read into the code by virtue of Levi's
clearly articulated policy, thereby suggesting that this section offers em-
ployees limited protection.
A similar result for the employer was reached in a second case,
Agabao v. Delta Design, Inc. where the employer, Delta Design, Inc. (Delta
Design,) had a non-fraternization policy.'58 The policy explicitly prohibited
the employment of relatives (including co-habitation) when "'one relative
would be in a direct supervisory relationship to the other,' or when 'the re-
lationship causes an actual or potential conflict of interest within the Com-
pany.""" During approximately a year and a half, Ronaldo Agabao co-
habited with another Delta employee, Raquel Garong, and they had a child
together.' 6 During that same time, Agabao prepared and signed Garong's
performance reviews and approved her promotion and raise - all in viola-
tion of the company policy. 16' After his employer discovered the relation-
ship, Agabao was terminated for violating the company's policy, and
Agabao then sued Delta for violating his right to privacy under section
96(k).'
62
The court concluded that Agabao's position lacked merit, stating that
"when subdivision (k) was added to section 96 in 1999, it was established
that as a condition of employment, and for legitimate business reasons, an
employer may require an employee to relinquish the exercise of certain
rights.' ' 63 As an example, the court added, "[flor instance, although news-
157. Id.
158. Agabao v. Delta Design, Inc., No. D039642, 2003 WL 194950, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2003).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *3.
163. Id.
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paper reporters enjoy the constitutional right of free speech, their employ-
ment may be terminated for expressing views inconsistent with their em-
ployers' editorial policies." 1" The court explained that an employer may be
"'legitimately concerned with appearances of favoritism, possible claims of
sexual harassment and employee dissension, created by romantic relation-
ships between management and nonmanagement employees.""'  The
Agabao court even went so far as to presume that when the California leg-
islature added subsection k to section 96, "it knew of Crosier and other
cases establishing an employer's right to curtail activities of employees
when necessitated by legitimate business concers. ' '66 Acknowledging that
Delta's policy "'is to prevent actual and potential conflicts of interest and
actual or apparent favoritism in the workplace, to maintain good employee
morale and discipline and to maintain Company security and confidential-
ity of records,"' the court deemed it a "valid non-fraternization policy,"
thereby denying Agabao's claim.
67
In reaching the conclusion that section 96(k) was inapplicable, the
court rejected Agabao's reliance on Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp. "for the
premise that termination based on a private sexual relationship may be im-
proper." 168 A critical distinction, however, is that IBM did not have a non-
fraternization policy. To the contrary, IBM's policy was that it would be
concerned "'with an employee's off-the-job behavior only when it reduces
his ability to perform regular job assignments, interferes with the job per-
formance of other employees, or if his outside behavior affects the reputa-
tion of the company in a major way."' 69 The plaintiff-employee, Virginia
Rulon-Miller, was terminated as the result of an accusation made by her
supervisor regarding Rulon-Miller's romantic relationship with the man-
ager of a rival office products firm. 170 Because of the protection extended
by IBM's policy, Rulon-Miller prevailed on her claims for wrongful dis-
charge and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.''
Although California has both a state constitutional right to privacy and
a broadly worded statute protecting employees from invasions of privacy
164. Id. (citing Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc., 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802,
827 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a news reporter's First Amendment rights do not guaran-
tee him employment)).
165. Agabao, No. D039642, 2003 WL 194950, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30,
2003) (quoting Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App.
1983)).
166. Agabao, 2003 WL 194950, at *4 (citations omitted).
167. Id.
168, Id. at *4 n.4 (citing Rulon-Miller v. IBM Corp., 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App.
1984), overruled on other grounds by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 392,
401 n.42 (Cal. 1988).
169. Rulon-Miller, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
170. Id. at 528.
171. ld. at534-35.
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by their employers, California courts tend to find that non-fraternization
policies are permissible. Thus, these recent California cases indicate that
employers who seek to restrict their employees' off-duty relationships
should adopt anti-fraternization policies. To the extent that the employer
can articulate a reasonable connection between the policy and a legitimate
business reason for the policy, it is likely that such policies will be upheld,
even in California.
b. New York
New York also offers protection to employees for their off-duty ac-
tivities. More specific than the law in California, New York law provides
that it is unlawful for an employer
to refuse to hire, employ or license, or to discharge from employment
or otherwise discriminate against an individual in compensation, promotion
or terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of:
a. an individual's political activities outside of working
hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of
the employer's equipment or other property, if such activi-
ties are legal [with certain exceptions].. .;
b. an individual's legal use of consumable products prior to
the beginning or after the conclusion of the employee's
work hours, and off the employer's premises and without
use of the employer's equipment or other property;
c. an individual's legal recreational activities outside work
hours, off of the employer's premises and without use of
the employer's equipment or other property; or
d. an individual's membership in a union or any exercise of
rights granted under ... the civil service law.'
The law, however, specifically does not protect activity that "creates a
material conflict of interest related to the employer's trade secrets, pro-
prietary information or other proprietary or business interest."'' 73 This leg-
islation was "designed to prevent discrimination against employees for
172. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(b)-(d) (McKinney 2004).
173. See id. § 201-d(3)(a). The law also does not protect certain acts by employ-
ees of a state agency that conflict with their official duties and acts that these employees do
which are in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. § 201 -d(3)(b)-(e).
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their activities outside of working hours.' 74 Underscoring the purpose of
the law and the bargaining that went into the drafting process, Governor
Cuomo stated, upon signing the legislation, that "these bills... properly
strike the difficult balance between the right to privacy in relation to non-
working hours activities of individuals and the right of employers to regu-
late behavior which has an impact on the employee's performance or on the
employer's business."'
75
A number of cases have tested the bounds of this law after it became
effective in 1992, including two cases involving political activities. 76 The
political activity cases discuss the scope of Labor Law section 201-d per-
taining to subsection (a), which protects an individual's political activities
outside of working hours. In the first case, Richardson v. City of Saratoga
Springs, plaintiff-employee Scott Richardson claimed that his job duties
were modified and he was denied a promotion because he supported a po-
litical opponent to the Commissioner of Public Works.'77 The court found
that it was "reasonably inferable" that the changes were "prompted by the
Commissioner's awareness, and disapproval, of [plaintiff's] opposing po-
litical activities.... ,,7 In short, the court held that Richardson "satisfied
his burden of coming forth with legally admissible proof that he was
treated detrimentally - by having his job duties adjusted in a way that was
calculated to, and did, lead to his being denied a promotion and concomi-
tant salary increase... because of his off-duty political activities.' 79
In another case, Cavanaugh v. Doherty, the court likewise found that
the plaintiff stated a cause of action for a violation of Labor Law section
201-d 8 In this case, Cavanaugh was allegedly fired as the result of a po-
litical argument in a restaurant with Thomas Doherty, a high-ranking offi-
cial in the Executive Department.' The argument was allegedly "precipi-
tated by Doherty's derogatory remarks concerning plaintiff's supervisors
and their political affiliations," as the "verbal exchange culminated in
plaintiff calling Doherty an 'asshole,' to which he allegedly responded that
174. Devine v. N.Y. Convention Ctr. Operating Corp., 639 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905
(Sup. Ct. 1996).
175. Id. (citing Memorandum from Governor Mario M. Cuomo approving Act of
Aug. 7, 1992, ch. 776, 1992 N.Y. Laws 2916, which prohibited discrimination against en-
gagement in legal activities during non-working hours).
176. See ,e.g., Richardson v. City of Saratoga Springs, 667 N.Y.S.2d 995 (App.
Div. 1998) (holding that where it is reasonably inferable that the modification of occupa-
tional duties were connected to political activities, the employer has violated the law);
Cavanaugh v. Doherty, 675 N.Y.S.2d 143 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that an employee may
have a cause of action against an employer even where the political activity is defined as an
argument with a political official).
177. Richardson, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
178. Id. at 997.
179. Id.
180. Cavanaugh, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
181. Id. at 146.
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'he would "have her job in the morning .... 82 The Richardson and Cava-
naugh cases indicate a willingness on the part of New York courts to pro-
tect employees' political activities and related speech if there is a connec-
tion between the speech and adverse employment action.
The majority of the cases interpreting the scope of Labor Law section
201-d, however, pertain to adverse employment action based on the scope
of "legal recreational activities." Of those cases, most pertain to an em-
ployee's off-duty personal relationships,'83 and in one case, the plaintiff at-
tempted to extend "legal recreational activities" to include the installation
of telephone equipment for personal profit." Under the statute, "recrea-
tional activities" is defined to include "any lawful, leisure-time activity, for
which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally en-
gaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports,
games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies
and similar material."'85 Unlike political activities cases which have been
more straight forward, personal relationship association cases produced an
early division of opinion between the state and federal courts in New York.
The state court address this issue first in State of New York v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., which involved two Wal-Mart employees who were dating
while the female employee was married but separated from her spouse.
18 6
At that time, Wal-Mart's non-fraternization policy prohibited a "dating re-
lationship between a married associate and another associate other than his
or her own spouse" ... "'87 The New York Attorney General commenced an
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., McCavitt v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 495
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that employee's dating relationship with a fellow corporate officer
was not a recreational activity); Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 725 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App.
Div. 2001) (deciding that an extramarital affair was not a recreational activity and thus em-
ployee's termination did not violate § 201-d); Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, 729
N.Y.S.2d 519 (App. Div. 2001) (ruling that cohabiting with a man married to another
woman was not a recreational activity and thus employee's termination did not violate §
201-d); Aquilone v. Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y., No. 98 Civ. 5451 (SAS), 1998 WL
872425, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1998) (holding that a close personal friendship should
be considered a protected recreational activity for the purposes of § 201-d); Pasch v. Katz
Media Corp., No. 94 CIV. 8554 (RPP), 1995 WL 469710, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995)
(concluding that cohabitation with a coworker might be a recreational activity); State of
N.Y. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 80737/93, 1993 WL 649275, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
16, 1993) (holding that an extramarital relationship might constitute "recreational activities"
even though "[tihe Complaint does not specify what activities [the employees] engaged in,
i.e. whether it was sports, games, hobbies .. "), rev'd, 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div.
1995) (holding that the term "recreational activities" does not include dating relationships).
184. Cheng v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
185. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(1)(b) (McKinney 2004).
186. See Wal-Mart, 1993 WL 649275, at *1 (finding that dating while married
was included within the scope of "legal recreational activities" prohibited by the New York
Labor Code), rev'd, 621 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 1995).
187. Wal-Mart, 1993 WL 649275, at *1.
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action on behalf of the aggrieved employees against Wal-Mart, asserting
that Wal-Mart's policy violated section 201-d(2)(c) of New York's Labor
Code, which prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment
action based on an "'individual's legal recreational activities."" 8 8 The trial
court refused to dismiss this cause of action, stating that the "conduct al-
leged to have been the cause of the 'firing' - 'dating' while one was mar-
ried, may well be 'recreational activities' within the meaning of the stat-
ute." 
89
This early view of the scope of "legal recreational activities" was
promptly struck down on appeal. The New York Appellate Division de-
clined to "force" a "dating relationship" within the meaning of "recrea-
tional activities," stating:
To us, "dating" is entirely distinct from and, in fact, bears
little resemblance to "recreational activity." Whether char-
acterized as a relationship or an activity, an indispensable
element of "dating," in fact its raison d'etre, is romance,
either pursued or realized. For that reason, although a dat-
ing couple may go bowling and under the circumstances
call that activity a "date," when two individuals lacking
amorous interest in one another go bowling or engage in
any other kind of "legal recreational activity," they are not
,,dating.
, , 9°
In reaching its conclusion, the court also pointed to the "voluminous
legislative history to the enactment."' 9' The court found it evidenced an
"obvious intent to limit the statutory protection to certain clearly defined
categories of leisure-time activities ... personal relationships fall outside
the scope of legislative intent."' 92 The majority's holding implies that sec-
tion 201-d offers no protection to a relationship with a romantic - or poten-
tially romantic - component.
Not all of the appellate judges hearing the case agreed with this lim-
ited view of recreational activity. In a dissenting opinion in the Wal-Mart
case, Justice Yesawich expressed his disagreement with the premise that
"dating" falls outside of the general definition of "recreational activities."
93
In Justice Yesawich's view, the statute "by its terms, appears to encompass
social activities, whether or not they have a romantic element, for it in-
188. Id. (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(c)).
189. Id. at *2.
190. State of N.Y. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (App. Div.
1995).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 159-60.
193. Id. at 160 (Yesawich, J., dissenting).
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cludes any lawful activity pursued for recreational purposes and undertaken
during leisure time."' 94 Contrary to the majority's narrow reading of the
statute, Justice Yesawich stated:
the Legislature's primary intent in enacting Labor Law §
201-d was to curtail employers' ability to discriminate on
the basis of activities that are pursued outside of work
hours, and that have no bearing on one's ability to perform
one's job, and concomitantly to guarantee employees a
certain degree of freedom to conduct their lives as they
please during nonworking hours. .... ,9
Similar to the sentiment expressed by Justice Yesawich, the federal
district court in the Southern District of New York declined to follow the
majority opinion in Wal-Mart. It reached a different conclusion in Pasch v.
Katz Media Corp., ,96 another case involving a romantic relationship. Re-
jecting the Wal-Mart court's holding, the Pasch court concluded that "'co-
habitation' that occurs off the employer's premises, without use of the em-
ployer's equipment and not on the employer's time, should be considered a
protected activity for which an employer may not discriminate, absent
some showing that such activity involves a material conflict of interest with
the employer's business interests."'97
Rejecting the position taken by the majority in Wal-Mart, the Pasch
court read the legislative history as "evidencing an intent to include co-
habitation as a recreational activity protected by the statute."'98 In support
of this position, the court quoted the bill's sponsor, Senator Lack, who
stated that the statute is intended to remedy
instances in which employers are trying to regulate an em-
ployee's off duty activities, contending that what employ-
ees do off-hours has an impact on the employer. But
should an employer have a right to forbid a person from
engaging in a legal activity, such as wearing a button for a
particular candidate, simply because the employer does not
agree with those political sentiments? ... We have long
since passed the days of company towns, where the com-
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Pasch v. Katz Media Corp., No. 94 CIV 8554 (RPP), 1995 WL 469710,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995) (concluding that cohabitation which does not involve a "ma-
terial conflict of interest" with the employer's business interests is protected activity within
the scope of the New York Labor Code).
197. Id.
198. Id. at *4.
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pany told you when to work, where to live and what to buy
in their stores. This bill will ensure that employers do not
tell us how to think and play on our own time.'99
The district court then held that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to
make a prima facie case under Section 201-d(2)(c). °° Consistent with its
broad interpretation of "recreational activity" under section 201-d, the
Southern District of New York also held in a subsequent case that inas-
much as a "close personal friendship is analogous to cohabitation," it
should be considered protected activity under the statute. 20 ' In so holding,
the court did say, however, that if it could be determined that the em-
ployee's relationship in question "involved a material conflict of interest,"
the employer should prevail.'
The differences between the federal court and state court interpreta-
tions of the scope of "legal recreational activity" came to an end with
McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp..203 In this case, plaintiff-
employee Jess McCavitt alleged that he was passed over for a promotion
and then terminated largely because of his dating relationship with another
officer of the company. °4 Mr. McCavitt was terminated despite the fact
that Swiss Reinsurance did not have a written non-fraternization policy, nor
did it have an anti-nepotism policy, and the relationship allegedly did not
have any "repercussions whatsoever for the professional responsibilities"
of McCavitt 05 After considering the conflicting decisions in the Wal-
Mart,2°6 Pasch" and Aquilone" cases, the Second Circuit held that "noth-
ing in logic, the language of § 201-d, its legislative history, or New York
state case law.., leads us to conclude that the New York Court of Appeals
would hold that romantic dating is a 'recreational activity' under New York
Labor Law § 201-d(1)(b)" ...'2 09 Two subsequent decisions likewise held
that off-duty romantic relationships are not protected by this law as recrea-
199. Id. at *5 (citing NEW YORK STATE ASSEMB., SENATE MEMO, N.Y. State As-
semb., 215th Sess., at 9 (1992)).
200. Id. at *6.
201. Aquilone v. Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y., No. 98 Civ. 5451 (SAS), 1998
WL 872425, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1998).
202. Id.
203. 237 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2001).
204. Id. at 167.
205. Id.
206. State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 80737/93, 1993 WL 649275, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 1993), rev'd, 621 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 1995).
207. Pasch v. Katz Corp., No. 94 CIV. 8554 (RPP), 1995 WL 469710, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,1995).
208. Aquilone v. Republic Nat'l Bank of N.Y., No. 98 Civ. 5451 (SAS), WL
872425, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 1998).
209. McCavitt v. Swiss Reins. Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2001).
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tional activities.1 °
It is worth noting, however, the humorous and begrudging concur-
rence in the McCavitt case, in which Judge McLaughlin encapsulated the
reality of this series of decisions limiting the scope of section 201-d. "Sis-
ter Mary Lauretta, a Roman Catholic nun, once counseled: [T]o be success-
ful, the first thing to do is fall in love with your work. She should, of
course, now have to add: [J]ust don't fall in love at work.""' As Judge
McLaughlin observed, the New York legislature,
should have extended protection to the pursuit of a roman-
tic relationship with whomever an employee chooses -
even a fellow, unmarried employee - outside the office,
during non-working hours. This is compelling so in today's
society, where ostracizing anyone associated with one's of-
fice from the acceptable dating pool would doom the ma-
jority of the population to the life of a Trappist monk.2
He then lamented that it is "repugnant to our most basic ideals in a
free society that an employer can destroy an individual's livelihood on the
basis of whom he is courting, without first having to establish that the em-
ployee's relationship is adversely affecting the employer's business inter-
ests." 3
As it now stands, employees' personal romantic relationships are not
protected in New York. Furthermore, there is no indication that "recrea-
tional activity" will be broadly interpreted. The Southern District of New
York thwarted another attempt by an employee to seek refuge under New
York Labor Law section 201-d.2 4
210. See, e.g., Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 725 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App.
Div. 2001) (holding that a claim brought by an employee terminated for having an extra-
marital affair with a coworker, was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim under La-
bor Law § 201-d); Bilquin v. Roman Catholic Church, 729 N.Y.S.2d 519, 519 (App. Div.
2001) (finding that the lower court properly granted summary judgment in favor of em-
ployer on a § 201-d claim, where an employee was terminated because she lived with a man
married to another woman).
211. McCavitt, 237 F.3d at 168-69 (McLaughlin, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original).
212. Id. at 169-70.
213. Id. at 170.
214. See Cheng v. New York Tel. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (finding that the plaintiffs claim that the installation of telephone equipment for
profit was not included as a protected, legal "recreational activity" under the New York
statute). The court found that the plaintiffs claim was "patently frivolous." Id.
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c. North Dakota
As part of its general anti-discrimination statute, North Dakota pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of participation in lawful off-duty activ-
ity.
2 '5 Specifically, it is considered a "discriminatory practice" for an em-
ployer to:
fail or refuse to hire a person; to discharge an employee; or
to accord adverse or unequal treatment to a person or em-
ployee with respect to application, hiring, training, appren-
ticeship, tenure, promotion, upgrading, compensation, lay-
off, or a term, privilege, or condition of employment...
[based on an employee's] ... participation in lawful activ-
ity off the employer's premises during nonworking hours
which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-
related interests of the employer.1 6
The broad provisions preventing employers from discriminating
against employees for lawful activity taking place off of the employer's
premises during non-working hours were originally enacted in 1991. 217 The
legislation was designed "to expand the law prohibiting employment dis-
crimination and preclude employers from inquiring into an employee's
non-work conduct, including an employee's weight and smoking, marital,
or sexual habits.,, 2"8 According to the court in Hougum v. Valley Memorial
Homes, the North Dakota legislature added the conflict-of-interest language
in 1993 to clarify conflicts between the employee's protected lawful off-
duty activities and the employment-at-will doctrine." 9 The court explained
that the 1993 amendments were designed to give employers some assur-
ance that off-duty conduct which is "'deleterious to the well-being of the
employer's mission"' will not be protected.22° Consistent with this goal, it
is also not
215. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (1997). This statute also protects employees
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or
mental disability, or status with respect to marriage or public assistance. See id. at § 14-
02.4-01.
216. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03.
217. Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 1998 ND 24, 1 40, 574 N.W.2d 812, 821.
218. Id. For citations to the statute's session law testimonies, see id..
219. Id. at T41.
220. Id. (quoting ch. 140, 1993 N.D. Sess. Laws (codified as amended at N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03)).
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a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse
to hire and employ an individual for a position... or to
discharge an individual from a position on the basis of that
individual's participation in a lawful activity that is off the
employer's premises and that takes place during non-
working hours and which is not in direct conflict with the
essential business-related interests of the employer, if that
participation is contrary to a bona fide occupational quali-
fication that reasonably and rationally relates to employ-
ment activities and the responsibilities of a particular em-
ployee or group of employees, rather than to all employees
of that employer.22'
Similar to the challenges brought in California and New York, the
language of the North Dakota statute has sparked litigation.
In the first case, Fatland v. Quaker State Corp., the scope of the bona
fide occupational qualification was at issue.222 Employee Wallace Fatland
was terminated after he failed to divest himself of an ownership interest in
a fast lube business which was a competitor of his employer, Quaker State
Corporation (Quaker State).223 Quaker State had asked Fatland to liquidate
his interest in accordance with its Conflict of Interest Policy (Policy) that
was designed to prevent its employees from being involved with another
entity "which is or has the potentiality of being at variance with the best
interests of [Quaker State]. 224 Fatland brought a claim for discrimination
under the North Dakota statute, section 14-02.4.225 Quaker State argued
"that the Policy sets forth a bona fide occupational qualification that rea-
sonably and rationally relates only to employees, such as Fatland, whose
involvement in an off-hours activity constitutes a conflict of interest with
the employer because of the position of the employee within the com-
pany., 226 A Quaker State customer complained after he realized that infor-
mation he divulged to Fatland could be used by Fatland in connection with
227his fast-lube business with which he was in direct competition.
Based on these facts, the court found that Quaker State had a legiti-
mate concern because prohibiting employees, such as Fatland
from operating off-hours businesses that would benefit
from confidential information that the employees' posi-
221. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-08 (2003).
222. 62 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1995).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1071.
225. Id. at 1072.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1072-03.
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tions within the company would enable them to secure
from competitors, resulting in resentment towards, and
termination of business with, the employer is a bona fide
occupational qualification that is reasonably and rationally
related to a particular employee or group of employees
within the meaning of section 14-02.4-08.228
Importantly, with regard to the scope of the bona fide occupational
qualification requirement, the court in Fatland agreed with Quaker State
that had Fatland been employed in a different capacity, such as a janitor,
"his operation of a fast lube operation would not necessarily have had a
deleterious effect on Quaker State's relationship with its other custom-
ers." 229 In practice, Quaker State only required "key employees" to submit
annually signed Policy compliance statements, which the court viewed as
reasonable within the parameters of section 14-02.4-08.230
In another case, Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, the North Da-
kota Supreme Court was asked to consider the scope of "lawful activity. 23'
Under the unseemly set of facts in this case, plaintiff-employee Daniel
Hougum was inadvertently observed "masturbating in an enclosed toilet
stall in a men's public restroom at a Sears store ... After Hougum was
charged with disorderly conduct, he was terminated by his employer from
his position as staff chaplain.23' Hougum sued his former employer for dis-
crimination under the North Dakota statutes, claiming that he was engaged
in a "lawful activity" and thus was wrongfully terminated. 4 When pre-
sented with the question of whether Hougum's conduct was "lawful," the
court, however, declined to make a determination as a matter of law.235 In
so doing, the court stated that Hougum "raised a disputed factual issue
about whether [or not] his conduct was forbidden by law and therefore may
fit within the protected status of lawful activity off the employer's prem-
ises.
236
The court in Hougum likewise found that there was an issue of fact
concerning the employer's claim that the offending behavior adversely af-
fected its business. 7 With regard to the employer's assertion that
Hougum's conduct "undermined his effectiveness as a chaplain and there-
228. Id. at 1073.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 1998 ND 24, , 574 N.W.2d 812.
232. Id. at 815 T 2.
233. Id. at 5. Hougum, who was an ordained minister, had worked for his em-
ployer since 1980. Id.
234. Id. at 820-21, 38.
235. Id. at 822, T 45.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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fore directly conflicted with its business-related interests," the court also
declined to rule as a matter of law.238 Because the kind of conflicts raised in
Hougum were "not the same type of business and economic conflicts of
interest at stake in Fatland," the court ruled against the employer on its
motion for summary judgment.239 While it seems reasonable in Hougum
that genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs conduct was
in "direct conflict" with the employer's business interests, it is less under-
standable that the court would decline to decide as a matter of law whether
the conduct itself was lawful or unlawful.
In a third case, Jose v. Norwest Bank North Dakota, the North Dakota
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether section 14-02.4-03 prohib-
its an employer from engaging in a retaliatory discharge against an em-
ployee who participates in an internal investigation.2' ° The plaintiff em-
ployees were terminated after they participated in an investigation of work
performance issues involving their superviscr and another senior em-
ployee. 24' The court refused to extend the scope of section 14-02.4-03 to
include a clear public policy against retaliatory discharge for participating
in an internal investigation of other employees' job performances where
there was no evidence that the termination was the result of participation in
lawful activity off the employer's premises during non-working hours.4 2
Thus far, these cases indicate that North Dakota is not inclined to give sec-
tion 14-02.4-03 an expansive reading.
d. Colorado
The statute in Colorado limiting employers' use of off-duty conduct as
the basis for adverse employment action is very similar to the North Dakota
statute. Under Colorado law:
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment prac-
tice for an employer to terminate the employment of any
employee due to that employee's engaging in any lawful
activity off the premises of the employer during nonwork-
ing hours unless such a restriction:
(a) Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is
reasonably and rationally related to the employment
activities and responsibilities of a particular employee
238. Id.
239. Id. at [46.
240. 1999 ND 175, 18, 599 N.W.2d 293,298.
241. Id. at 295, 13, 5.
242. Id. at 298-299, T 18.
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or a particular group of employees, rather than to all
employees of the employer; or
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any
responsibilities to the employer or the appearance of
such a conflict of interest."
The statute also explicitly provides that an aggrieved person claiming
a violation of this law may bring a civil suit for damages and may sue for
"all wages and benefits which would have been due him up to and includ-
ing the date of the judgment had the discriminatory or unfair employment
practice not occurred."2"4 All such actions are subject to a six-month statute
of limitations.245
One of the first cases testing the bounds of section 24-34-402.5, Gwin
v. Chesrown Chevrolet, Inc. (Chesrown), dealt with the question of whether
an employer must adopt a specific restriction against lawful off-hours ac-
tivity before being found in violation of the statute.4 6 David Gwin was a car
salesman for Chesrown until he was fired after voluntarily participating in a
sales seminar with a motivational speaker.247 Chesrown paid half of the
seminar fee and the remainder was to be deducted from Gwin's pay-
check. 24' Gwin was assured that he could get his money refunded if he was
not satisfied with the speaker; after attempting to do so, he was fired.249 At
trial and on appeal, Chesrown argued that Gwin failed to prove the exis-
243. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (1988). See generally Craig M. Cornish,
Workplace Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in Colorado: Part 1, 27 COLO. LAW. 5 (Nov.
1998) (providing an overview primarily of the philosophical and theoretical issues regarding
workplace privacy law in Colorado); Craig M. Cornish, Workplace Privacy, Autonomy, and
Dignity in Colorado: Part 11, 27 COLO. LAW. 5 (Dec. 1998) (providing a practical and me-
chanical overview of workplace privacy law in Colorado); Jessica Jackson, Colorado's Life-
style Discrimination Statute: A Vast and Muddled Expansion of Traditional Employment
Law, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 143 (1996) (discussing the scope of the statute and its policy im-
plications).
244. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(2)(a) (1988). The statute also provides
that a plaintiff has an obligation to mitigate damages and that the court "shall award the pre-
vailing party in such action court costs and a reasonable attorney fee." Id. at § 24-34-
402.5(2)(a)-(b).
245. Galieti v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 F. Supp 104, 106 (D. Colo.
1993). In so holding, the court adopted the position taken by the Colorado Civil Rights Di-
vision. Id.
246. Gwin v. Chesrown Chevrolet, Inc., 931 P.2d 466, 470 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
Note that Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997) (en banc), which is
discussed infra and in Part II.A.2 supra, was ongoing during this time.
247. Gwin, 931 P.2d at 468.
248. Id.
249. Id. Note that Gwin, who is African-American, was fired, but that three
white employees who similarly requested refunds were not terminated. Id. This fact led to
Gwin's claim of race discrimination against Chesrow. Id.
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tence of a "restriction" in violation of section 24-34-402.5(1).250 Under
Chesrown's theory, in order for the statute to be applicable, "an employer
must first restrict its employees' off-the-job activities;" under such an in-
terpretation, "only when an employer imposes a restriction does the statute
take effect to protect a worker's off-the-job privacy. 25' Chesrown's argu-
ment was patently rejected by the court, which noted that under this ap-
proach "an employer could avoid the reach of the statute by simply not
warning employees of any restriction, thus creating an absurd result."252 In
an important point of clarification, the court stated that the "issue of re-
strictions of an employee's activities arises only as part of an employer's
defense to an action.., no specific restriction must be adopted by an em-
ployer as a predicate to violating the prohibition." 53 This case effectively
halted a potential inroad curbing the scope of privacy now afforded to em-
ployees.
Lastly, a comprehensive decision about the scope of the bona fide oc-
cupational requirement and conflict of interest provisions of section 24-34-
402.5 is contained in Marsh v. Delta Air Lines. 4 Michael Marsh, a bag-
gage handler for Delta Airlines (Delta), wrote a letter critical of his em-
ployer that was published in the Denver Post, and he was subsequently
terminated for engaging in "'conduct unbecoming [of] a Delta em-
ployee. -2 155 Marsh sued for wrongful discharge, claiming that he engaged
in legal off-duty activity which should be protected by Colorado law.256
The parties agreed that Marsh was engaged in lawful activity, so the issue
before the court concerned only the exceptions to the general prohibition
against adverse action based on such lawful activity. 5 7 Inasmuch as there
were no prior cases interpreting the substantive portions of section 24-34-
402.5, and the legislative history was scant, the court endeavored to deter-
mine whether Delta was justified in firing Marsh under the exceptions to
the statute. 5
In support of its position, Delta presented four arguments: 1) Marsh
was terminated "for engaging in an activity related to a bona fide occupa-
tional requirement"; 2) the activity was "rationally related" to Marsh's job
responsibilities; 3) publication of the letter led to a conflict of interest be-
tween Marsh and Delta; and 4) "a portion of the activity occurred on Delta
250. Id. at 470.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997).
255. Id. at 1460-61.
256. Id. at 1461.
257. Id. at 1461-62.
258. Id. at 1462.
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property. ' 259 With regard to the first argument, the court articulated its un-
derstanding of the meaning of section 24-34-402.5:
[T]he law was meant to provide a shield to employees who
engage in activities that are personally distasteful to their
employer, but which activities are legal and unrelated to an
employee's job duties. In application, this statute should
protect the job security of homosexuals who would other-
wise be fired by an employer who discriminates against
gay people, members of Ross Perot's new political party
who are employed by a fervent democrat, or even smokers
who are employed by an employer with strong anti-
tobacco feelings.2'6
The "common thread" or critical issue is that the activity must be "un-
related" to the employee's job duties for it to be truly "non-work related"
1 61activity. Moreover, the court acknowledged that the exceptions to the
general rule are indicative of the fact that the legislature "did not intend this
privacy statute to provide a sword to employees thereby allowing employ-
ees to strike indiscriminate public blows against the business reputation of
their employer.
2 62
On this premise, the court proceeded to elaborate on the protections
offered to employers who take adverse employment action against employ-
ees based on off-duty conduct. First, the court found that the bona fide oc-
cupational requirement encompassed within the scope of the statute in-
cludes an "implied duty of loyalty, with regard to public communications,
that employees owe to their employers. 263 If Marsh had been acting as a
whistle blower, expressing concerns about public safety, he could have re-
course under the Colorado privacy statute. The court, however, deter-
mined that the concerns raised were in the nature of "customer service,"
and that Marsh was merely a "disgruntled worker venting his frustrations"
publicly, instead of availing himself of the internal grievance procedures.
Accordingly, the court held that Marsh's termination did not violate the
statute. 266 Although this was sufficient to defeat Marsh's section 24-34-
402.5 claim, the court addressed Delta's other arguments to add further
clarification to the scope of the exceptions. In each instance, the court
259. Id. at 1461-62.
260. Id. at 1462.
261. Id. at 1462-63.
262. Id. at 1463.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266..Id.
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chose to interpret the exceptions narrowly, against Delta.
First, the court considered the meaning of the portion of the statutory
exception regarding the responsibilities of "'a particular employee or a
particular group of employees,"' finding that "this portion of the statute
was probably crafted to allow employers to require certain high profile
members of their staff from foregoing involvement in activities that would
call into question their competence. 2 67 The court declined to extend this
portion of the statute to an employer's entire workforce-including bag-
gage handlers-who do not have a unique function of portraying a positive
image for Delta.2'6 Under the court's interpretation, this exception is to be
interpreted narrowly.
Second, with regard to Delta's conflict-of-interest argument, the court
signaled that it was not interested in giving this statutory exception a broad
reading. To the contrary, it found that "the term conflict of interest should
be given its generally understood meaning; that is, that it relates to 'fiduci-
aries and their relationship to matters of private interest or gain to them' or
a 'situation in which regard for one duty tends to lead to disregard of an-
other."' 269 Under this standard, no conflict of interest was created when
Marsh wrote the letter.270
Third, the court also defeated Delta's assertion that the statute should
not apply to Marsh because some of the conduct took place on Delta's
property.27' Although the court acknowledged that Marsh copied the letter
in question on Delta's copy machine, this "de minimis act... [did] not, by
itself, vitiate the applicability of the statute." '272
In a third case, Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, already discussed
herein in the context of unreasonable publicity, the Colorado Supreme
Court overturned a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff-employee Robert Bor-
quez on the ground that it was not supported by the lawful activities stat-
ute.273 In a resounding statement on the importance of jury instructions, the
court held that the instruction given to the jury failed to include a charge
regarding plaintiff s section 24-34-402.5 claim; it only addressed his sexual
orientation claim under a Denver ordinance prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation.2 7' Even though the trial court recognized that
evidence presented at the trial may have supported Borquez's claim that he
was discharged based upon lawful activities that he did off his employer's
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1464 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (6th ed. 1990)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371 (D. Colo. 1997) (en banc).
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
274. Id. at 375-76.
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premises, the jury was not appropriately instructed on this claim, despite
Borquez's specific request that such a charge be tailored to section 24-34-
402.5.275 Accordingly, the court in finding the verdict was not supported by
the statute, ruled against Borquez.276
e. Massachusetts
Although Massachusetts does not have a separate statute addressing an
employee's off-duty activities, it does have a law generally providing a
right to privacy for its citizens: "[a] person shall have a right against unrea-
sonable, substantial or serious interference with his privacy. 277 This statute
has been interpreted to apply to employees who seek to protect their private
lives from their employers, but it is not without limitations. The Massa-
chusetts Privacy Act does not necessarily protect against the disclosure of
"private facts" - meaning those that are "not public;" rather, it "pro-
scribe[s] the disclosure of facts about an individual that are of a highly per-
sonal or intimate nature when there exists no legitimate, countervailing in-
terest. ' ' 7 1 In addition, the reasonableness of the disclosure "must be
weighed against an employer's valid business interests. 2 79 The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that there are circumstances in
which "an employer would always be liable for discharging an employee
for his refusal to answer questions not relevant to its business purposes. In
public policy terms, it is the degree of intrusion on the rights of the em-
ployee which is most important." 2'o In the employment context, an "em-
ployer's legitimate interest in determining [its] employees' effectiveness in
their jobs should be balanced against the seriousness of the intrusion on the
,,281employees' privacy. If a company can articulate legitimate business
reasons for seeking information about an off-duty incident, the intrusion is
not actionable under the Massachusetts Privacy Act. 2
Such was the case in French v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 283 In this
case, a drinking incident involving United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) em-
ployees took place at the home of UPS employee, Christopher French .
Several UPS employees, including French and his supervisor, Tom Clark,
attended a beer festival and then went back to French's home.8 5 While
275. Id.
276. Id. at 376.
277. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § IB (Law Co-op 1999).
278. Bratt v. IBM Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 133-34 (Mass. 1984).
279. Id. (citing Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982).
280. Cort, 431 N.E.2d at 913.
281. Bratt, 467 N.E.2d at 135.
282. French v. United Parcel Serv., 2 F. Supp. 2d 128, 131 (D. Mass. 1998).
283. Id. at 128.
284. Id. at 130.
285. Id.
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they were there, UPS employee Daniel DeButts became intoxicated, and
"'emotionally volatile and uncontrollable,"' ultimately injuring himself.26
Clark wanted French to report the incident to UPS.2 7 After initially de-
clining to do so, French succumbed to Clark's pressure and informed vari-
288
ous superiors of the details of the incident . As a result, French was sus-
pended pending an investigation, was allegedly "'brow-beaten about the
incident"' and, ultimately, had to be treated for depression. 9
French brought a claim for invasion of privacy in violation of the
Massachusetts statute, alleging that UPS violated his right to privacy by:
"(a) insisting that he disclose details concerning an incident that occurred
during off-work hours at his home; (b) repeatedly contacting his mental
health providers without his consent; and (c) penalizing him, in the form of
involuntary leave and demotion, for the incident.",21 In considering the
merits of French's claim, the court first found that the incident was not
"private" and that the information was not "'highly personal or inti-
mate.' ' 291 Moreover, in weighing the privacy interest of French against
UPS' interest in the information, the court found that, because UPS articu-
lated "legitimate business reasons for seeking information about the De-
Butts incident, including concerns about the soundness of judgment exer-
cised by its supervisory employees in regard to alcohol abuse generally as
well as in a particular setting where all participants were UPS employees,"
at most there was a de minimis invasion of privacy 22 Notwithstanding this
fact, the invasion did not rise to the level of actionable conduct under the
Massachusetts Privacy Act. 293 The French case is indicative of Massachu-
setts' reluctance to protect employees against overzealous employers where
294
an argument exists in favor of legitimate business interests.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. French, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 131.
291. Id. (quoting Bratt v. IBM Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 133-34 (Mass. 1984)).
The court noted, however, that it was "not necessary to decide whether [the information]
would be 'highly personal or intimate' information about DeButts, rather than French." Id.
at 131 n.1.
292. Id. at 13 1.
293. Id.
294. See, e.g., Bratt v. IBM Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 134-36 (Mass. 1984) (de-
scribing an employer's right to "seek certain personal information concerning an employee
when the importance of the information in assessing the employee's efficacy in his work
outweighs the employee's right to keep this information private"). See generally Cort v.
Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908, 911-14 (Mass. 1982) (finding that public policy consid-
erations did not justify imposition of liability on employer for discharging three employees
for refusing to answer certain questions concerning family, home ownership, physi-
cal/medical data, and activities, because most of the questions were relevant to the em-
ployee's job qualifications and were not improperly intrusive); Petsch-Schmid v. Boston
Edison Co., 914 F. Supp. 697, 707 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that under a Massachusetts stat-
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f Connecticut
Unlike the broader state statutes addressing off-duty conduct dis-
cussed herein, Connecticut's statute simply protects employees who exer-
cise certain federal and state constitutional rights from adverse action by
their employers. Under section 31-51q of the Connecticut statutes, any
employer (both private and state):
who subjects any employee to discipline or discharge on
account of the exercise by such employee of rights guar-
anteed by the first amendment to the United States Con-
stitution or section 3 [right of religious liberty], 4 [liberty
of speech and the press] or 14 [right to assemble and peti-
tion] of article first of the Constitution of the state 295...
shall be liable to such employee for damages caused by
such discipline or discharge, including punitive damages,
and for reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs of
any such action for damages.2
A person bringing an action under section 31-51q also has a right to a
jury trial.297 As is the case in New York, North Dakota, and Colorado,
however, this right is not absolute. To be protected, the activity must not
"substantially or materially interfere with the employee's bona fide job per-
formance or the working relationship between the employee and the em-
ployer... ,,298 Moreover, as a disincentive to a plaintiff tempted to bring a
baseless claim, the statute provides that "[i]f the court determines that such
action for damages was brought without substantial justification, the court
may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the employer."299
A key issue in cases brought pursuant to Connecticut section 31-51q
seems to be whether the speech at issue regards a matter of "public con-
cern."3' Protected speech addressing matters of public concern include
ute guaranteeing the right against the invasion of privacy, an employer '"has a conditional
privilege to disclose defamatory information concerning an employee when the publication
is reasonably necessary to serve the employer's legitimate interest in the fitness of an em-
ployee to perform his or her job."' (citation omitted)).
295. See generally CONN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 3, 4 & 14 (governing state rights to
religious liberty, rights to free speech and press, and rights to assemble and petition respec-
tively).
296. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2003).
297. Burrell v. Yale Univ., No. CV000159421S, 2003 WL 1477067, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2003).
298. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2004).
299. Id.
300. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-49 (1983) (establishing the matter-
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statements that can be "fairly considered as relating to any matter of politi-
cal, social, or other concern to the community.""° To determine if the em-
ployee's speech is a matter of public concern, the "content, form, and con-
text [of the speech], as revealed by the whole record," must be reviewed.3"
Thus, a determination must be made as to whether the employee is making
the statement as a "concerned citizen or as an employee set on airing a per-
sonal grievance.""3 3  Speech that is not protected includes speaking out
about perceived wrongdoings on the part of the employer's upper manage-
ment,3 ' speech relating to the terms and conditions of one's employment,3 5
and a supervisor's off-duty off premises sexual contact with a new em-
ployee.' In summary, only where a private employee is expressing con-
cern about a public matter will the Connecticut statute protect against ad-
verse employment action.
C. Federal Protection
Although there is no federal statute explicitly protecting employees
from discipline for off-duty behavior, several statutes are designed to pro-
tect aspects of employees's personal lives from undue scrutiny. Four are of
particular interest in the context of limiting the use of off-duty conduct in
connection with adverse employment decisions: the Immigration Reform
and Control Act; the Fair Credit Reporting Act; Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act; and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act is primarily designed to
prevent the employment of unlawful aliens, but it also contains protections
for potential employees who want to keep employers from prying into their
background beyond that which is necessary to comply with the law.
307
Likewise, whereas employers are permitted to use consumer reports in
connection with employment decisions, the Fair Credit Reporting Act is
designed to protect potential and current employees' private lives by re-
of-public-concern standard); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (7th Cir. 1994)
(declaring that to be protected by the First Amendment, "the speech must be on a matter of
public concern, and the employee's interest in expressing herself on this matter must not be
outweighed by any injury the speech could cause" to employee relationships).
301. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
302. Id. at 147-48. See, e.g., DiMartino v. Richens, 822 A.2d 205, 222 (Conn.
2003) (holding that an airport employee's speech expressing concerns about security was
protected as "a matter of public and social concern to the community" under § 31-5 lq).
303. Daley v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 734 A.2d 112, 123 (Conn. 1999).
304. Emerick v. Kuhn, 737 A.2d 456,468-69 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
305. Urashka v. Griffin Hosp., 841 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D. Conn. 1994).
306. MacKay v. Rayonier, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 22, 24 (D. Conn. 1999).
307 . Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(d)(2)(C),
(D) (2000) (requiring that an employee's personal information can only be used for the pur-
pose of verifying alienage and must be protected at all times).
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quiring employers to comply with certain notice provisions of the Act.3"8
Title VII offers some protection to employees in connection with the
associational aspects of off-duty privacy.' The same is true for the Em-
ployee Polygraph Protection Act, which limits the use of polygraph tests to
protect employees from unscrupulous employers who might seek informa-
tion beyond the scope of one's employment responsibilities.30  Accord-
ingly, a survey of the major provisions of each of these statutes is provided
herein. In addition to these federal statutes, it should also be noted that the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986"' and the Stored Commu-
nications Act protect certain employee communications from intentional
interception or access to stored communications."' Moreover, issues re-
garding off-duty conduct and privacy can also be raised under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act3 3 and the Health Insurance Portability Account-
ability Act of 1996. 3'4
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
Employers must comply with the requirements of the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),3 3 yet they must also not run afoul of
that Act by being overly aggressive about investigating an individual's
status. The purpose of the IRCA is to make it unlawful to employ "unau-
thorized aliens. 316 Within three days of hiring, an employer must complete
308. Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681 (1993).
309. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (2003).
310. Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (1999).
311. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.
(1993) [hereinafter the Wiretap Act].
312. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). It is not unusual, however, for employers to have
policies that allow them to monitor their employees's electronic communications with their
employees's consent, which is provided for in an exception to the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d). To be effective, such consent should detail the
scope of the employer's monitoring to ensure that the employee's consent is effective. See
Rassoull v. Maximus, Inc., No. 03-1756, 2004 WL 515540, at *1 (per curiam) (D. Md.
2002) (finding that employee's consent to interception of calls was enough to preclude em-
ployer violation of the Wiretap Act).
313. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
314. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. pts.
160-164 (2001) [hereinafter HIPAA]. See also Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996, 67 Fed. Reg. 153, 182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified as 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-
164) (reporting the significant changes that were made to HIPAA by the Bush administra-
tion). See generally SOLVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 13, at 210-217 (addressing the secu-
rity and privacy of health care data).
315. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a-d (2000).
316. See id. § 1324a(h)(3) (defining the term "unauthorized alien" as an individ-
ual that is not at the time of employment either (a) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, or (b) authorized to be employed by the IRCA or by the Attorney General).
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a Form 1-9 for that individual.37 To comply with the IRCA, the employer
must swear that it physically examined the individual's documentation to
verify the person's "identity and employment eligibility., 3 8 The employer
is in compliance with the requirements of the statute "if the document rea-
sonably appears on its face to be genuine." 3'9 For record-keeping purposes,
an employer may copy the document presented3 20 but it should not single
out certain nations of origin or citizenship, inasmuch as doing so would
potentially violate IRCA as an "unfair immigration-related employment
practice."32 '
The provisions that proscribe unfair immigration practices protect em-
ployees' privacy by preventing potential employers from learning more
about their background than is necessary to satisfy the requirements of
IRCA. Section 1324b of IRCA sets forth unfair immigration practices,
which provide that employers should not "discriminate against any individ-
ual (other than an unauthorized alien, as defined [by the act]) with respect
to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual for em-
ployment or the discharging of [an] individual from employment.. ." be-
322cause of the individual's national origin or citizenship status. For exam-
ple, an unfair immigration-related employment practice can occur if an
employer has an intent to discriminate by requesting "'more or different
documents than are required' to verify employment eligibility, or if it re-
fuses to honor documents that "'on their face [reasonably] appear to be
genuine.' 3 23 Another problem can arise if an employer makes specific re-
quests about the kinds of documents (which are, narrower in range than the
kinds of documents required by the IRCA) that must be produced to verify
employment authorization or identity, but the requests specially burden the
applicant.2 4 Overall, as long as a prospective employee produces docu-
ments that comply with the IRCA, an employer is limited in making further
requests regarding national origin and citizenship status.
317. See id. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring employer to attest that
an employee is not an unauthorized alien); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1) (2002).
318. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)(A) (2004).
319. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) (2000).
320. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(2)(iii)(B)(3) (2004).
321. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (2000). Such action could also prompt litigation un-
der Title VII.
322. § 1324b(a)(l).
323. Getahun v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing Officer, 124 F.3d 591, 594 (3d
Cir. 1997) (quoting Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6)
(2001)).
324. See Robison Fruit Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 147 F.3d 798, 800-801 (9th
Cir. 1998) (discussing the "document abuse" provision of IRCA in relation to employment
verification requests).
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2. Fair Credit Reporting Act
Having established an employee's employment authorization and
identity, an employer might want to investigate the background of a poten-
tial or current employee by using credit reports.325 Credit reports can give
employers a window into the private lives of their employees, including the
kind of debt they have, (e.g., credit card, mortgage, car loans, school loans)
payment history on that debt (including any late payments), previous names
and aliases, and information from court records (e.g., bankruptcy and di-
vorce matters). There are limits, however, on employers' obtaining and
using such reports under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1996 (FCRA).326
The purpose of the FCRA is to ensure the procedures used to gather infor-
mation about an individual's credit worthiness are "fair and equitable to the
consumer, with regard to... confidentiality, accuracy, [and] relevancy"
and that the information is used in accordance with the provisions of the
Act.327 In general, "consumer reports" include "any written, oral or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing
on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, charac-
ter, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living." '328 If the
user of a credit report leads the preparing agency to believe that the report
is to be used for an employment purpose, the report is considered to be a
"consumer report" within the meaning of the FCRA129 The FCRA, how-
ever, excludes from consumer credit reporting any "'report containing in-
formation solely as to transactions or experiences between the customer
and the person making the report.'
30
325. See, e.g., Pettus v. TRW Consumer Credit Serv., 879 F. Supp. 695, 698-99
(W.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that the use of credit reports to evaluate applicants for employ-
ment is not a discriminatory employment practice); Russell v. Shelter Fin. Servs., 604 F.
Supp. 201 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that a consumer loan company's request for a con-
sumer report on a former employee could not be justified for "employment purposes" where
the report was not requested until after the employee had announced his resignation).
326. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681-1700 (1972) (en-
forcing strict usage and disclosure requirements for credit reports). See, e.g., Zamora v.
Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Grand Junction, 811 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1987) (con-
cluding that the FCRA does not permit an employer to obtain a credit report on an em-
ployee's spouse). Note that the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which was originally enacted in
1970, is a part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.
327. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681(b) (1972).
328. § 1681a(d).
329. Comeaux v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 915 F.2d 1264, 1274 (9th
Cir. 1990); see also Hoke v. Retail Credit Corp., 521 F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th Cir. 1975)
(holding that information furnished by a consumer reporting agency to a state board of
medical examiners was furnished for "employment purposes" within the meaning of the
statute).
330. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1681a(d) (1972). See, e.g., Salazar v. Golden State Warriors,
124 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C.S. § 1681a(d) (1972)) (holding that a report by a private investigative firm that
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Under the FCRA, an employer may request a consumer report in con-
nection with making a decision about hiring, retention, or promotion of an
employee."' Prior to requesting such a report, however, the employer must
comply with the requirements of the statute; a person may not procure a
consumer report or cause a consumer report to be procured unless:
(i) a clear and conspicuous disclosure has been made in
writing to the consumer at any time before the report is
procured or caused to be procured, in a document that con-
sists solely of the disclosure, that a consumer report may
be obtained for employment purposes; and
(ii) the consumer has authorized in writing.., the pro-
curement of the report by that person.332
An employer may use a consumer report in connection with taking
adverse action against that employee.33 3 However, if after receiving the re-
port the employer plans to take adverse action against an individual based
on that report, the employer must comply with the requirements of the
FCRA.
Specifically, before taking any adverse action based in whole or in
part on the report, the employer must provide the employee or potential
employee with a copy of the report and a written description of the con-
sumer's rights under the Act. 33 The rights afforded consumers under such
circumstances include the rights: to know if the information has been used
adversely; 3 5 to have access to the information provided to the reporting
agency; 336 to contest inaccuracies;333 and to sue for damages in federal court
if an employer violates the Act. 338 Additionally, after the employer takes
adverse action on the basis of information contained in a consumer report,
it must provide the individual with oral or written notice of the adverse ac-
tion; contact information for the reporting agency; a statement that the re-
porting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is
unable to provide the consumer with the specific reason why the adverse
action was taken; notice that the individual is entitled to a free copy of the
videotaped plaintiff snorting cocaine at an off-duty wedding reception without the plaintiffs
knowledge which led to her termination, was excluded from the FRCA).
331. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2004).
332. § 1681b(b)(2)(A).
333. Wiggins v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 470, 477 (D. D.C. 1994).
334. 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(b)(3)(A).
335. § 1681m(a).
336. § 1681h.
337. § 1681i.
338. § 1681n; 16 C.F.R. pt. 601, app. A. (2002).
LIMITING THE USE OF OFF-DUTY CONDUCT
consumer report upon a request made within sixty days; and notice of the
right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of the report.339 All of these
FCRA requirements help to protect employees from unfair scrutiny by their
employers.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also protects employees and applicants
against discrimination related to off-duty conduct.324 An employee might
claim that he or she is the victim of race discrimination at work based on
some race-related off-duty activity. For example, if an employer did not
like its employee's participation in a rally sponsored by Louis Farrakhan
and the Nation of Islam, and took adverse action against that employee be-
cause of his participation, that employee could raise a claim for race dis-
crimination under Title VII.
Another area of off-duty conduct protected by Title VII deals with the
issue of interracial associations."4 The following are examples of such ac-
tionable behavior: discrimination against a white woman because of her
relationship with a black man; 4 2 firing a white man because of his marriage
to a black woman; ' and firing a white worker because of her non-marital
relationship with a minority co-worker.iA The right to interracial associa-
tion was also protected under Title VII in a case involving discrimination
against a white employee because he was the father of a biracial child."a
4. Employee Polygraph Protection Act
Most of the federal and state statutes discussed herein attempt to strike
339. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.
340. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17
(2003). But see Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17417, at *28, 30 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (concluding that the plaintiff-employee who was
fired after his employer learned that he was engaged in off-duty cross-dressing could not
bring claims under Title VII).
341. The same argument could be made under state anti-discrimination laws. See
O'Lone v. N.J. Dep't of Corrections, 712 A.2d 1177, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998) (ruling
that the state anti-discrimination law protected a white employee who suffered discrimina-
tion for dating a black woman); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, &
GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 993 (6th Cir. 1999) (analyzing a claim for a racially dis-
criminatory employment practice under the Tennessee anti-discrimination act similar to the
analysis used by federal Title VII claims).
342. Diffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 586
(5th Cir. 1998), vacated and reinstated on rehearing, 182 F.3d 333.
343. Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., 946 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
344. Speropoulos v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
345. Tetro. 173 F.3d at 994.
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a balance between the employees' privacy and the employers' legitimate
business interests. The Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA), how-
ever, is tipped decidedly in favor of employees, placing stringent restric-
tions on an employer's use of lie detector tests.346 This high degree of re-
striction is likely due to questions about the reliability of such tests, as well
as the inherent potential for abuse by overzealous employers. The potential
for eliciting a wide range of information wholly unrelated to one's em-
ployment is thwarted by the provisions of the EPPA. As defined by the
Act, a "lie detector" includes a "polygraph, deceptograph, voice stress
analyzer, psychological stress evaluator, or any other similar device
(whether mechanical or electrical) that is used.., for the purpose of ren-
dering a diagnostic opinion regarding the honesty or dishonesty of an indi-
vidual. ' 47 The EPPA prohibits employers from directly or indirectly re-
quiring, requesting, or causing any employee or prospective employee to
take or submit to any lie detector test.34 Moreover, the rights granted to
employees under the EPPA "may not be waived by contract or other-
wise."349
The major exception to the EPPA is used in the context of an "ongo-
ing investigation involving economic loss or injury to the employer's busi-
ness, such as theft, embezzlement, misappropriation, or an act of unlawful
industrial espionage or sabotage. 35° In such a context, a lie detector test
may be administered: 1) to an employee who "had access to the property
that is the subject of the investigation"; 2) when the employer has a "rea-
sonable suspicion that the employee was involved in the incident or activity
under investigation"; and 3) if the employer has signed a statement de-
scribing the specific incident or activity being investigated and the basis for
testing the particular employees."' After an employer complies with all of
these requirements, there are other procedural safeguards which must be
followed before, during, and after the polygraph exam.352 In terms of pro-
tecting an employee's privacy, it is important to note that throughout all
phases of the test, the employee is not to be asked any questions regarding:
346. Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §
2002 (1999).
347. § 2001(3).
348. § 2002(1). There are, however, exemptions for certain narrowly tailored
categories of employment, such as national defense, security services, or drug enforcement
officials. See 29 U.S.C. § 2006(b), (f) (2004) (providing exemptions for lie detector testing
for these categories of employment).
349 But see id. § 2005(d) (creating an exception to the waiver rule if "such waiver
is part of a written settlement agreed to and signed by the parties to the pending action or
complaint under this Act.").
350. § 2006(d)(1).
351. Id. § 2006(d)(2)-(4).
352. See id. §§ 2007-2008 (describing exam qualifications and exemption restric-
tions, as well as disclosure requirements).
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"(i) religious beliefs or affiliations; (ii) beliefs or opinions regarding racial
matters, (iii) political beliefs or affiliations, (iv) any matter relating to sex-
ual behavior, and (v) beliefs, affiliations, opinions, or lawful activities re-
garding unions or labor organizations." '353 Lastly, there are restrictions
placed on disclosure of information obtained during the examination.354
III. "IT IS OUR BUSINESS WHEN IT AFFECTS OUR BUSINESS:" EMPLOYER
LIABILITY FOR OFF-DUTY CONDUCT
Much has been detailed in this article about situations in which em-
ployees have successfully and unsuccessfully asserted privacy-based
claims. At this point, much of the jurisprudence in this area seems to sug-
gest that an employer's legitimate, business-related reason to know the in-
formation outweighs an employee's right to privacy. Moreover, another
compelling reason for employers to have access to information about cer-
tain kinds of off-duty conduct is that such behavior can subject them to li-
ability. There are a number of contexts in which employers can be held li-
able for the behavior of their employees outside of work, which arguably
gives employers a right to certain kinds of information.
Because they are faced with a potential mine field of liability, em-
ployers may want to delve into an employee's personal life. One of the
most fundamental claims that can be brought against an employer is for
negligent hiring and retention. Such claims can arise in a variety of con-
texts, including an incident of workplace violence.355 One example is the
recent shooting at a Lockheed Martin (Lockheed) plant in Mississippi in
which six workers were killed.356 Lockheed employee Doug Williams al-
legedly made racist threats to workers in the workplace prior to the incident
and wore a bootee on his head that looked like a Ku Klux Klan hood.37
One of the victims apparently expressed her concern about Williams' be-
havior, stating, "'[t]hey keep letting him come back in, but he's going to
kill us.' 35 8 In most states, an employer could be faced with lawsuits that
include negligent hiring and negligent retention claims. 59 Had Lockheed
353. § 2007(b)(1)(C).
354. See id. § 2008(a).
355. See, e.g., Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 424 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) (finding that a claim for negligent retention could be brought after an employee shot
and killed another employee outside of the employer's premises, since the employer knew
of the employee's propensity for abuse and violence towards other employees, and against
the victim in particular).
356. David M. Halbfinger, Mississippi: Death Toll Rises in Plant Shooting, N.Y.
TIMES, Jul. 16, 2003, at A15.
357. Adrian Campo-Flores, A Nightmare on the Job, NEWSWEEK, Jul. 21, 2003, at
42.
358. Id.
359. There are limitations, however, on such claims in Mississippi where em-
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investigated Williams's behavior both in the workplace and off-duty, it
may have averted the attack. Of course, had it done so, it could have also
faced a potential invasion of privacy lawsuit brought by the employee. As
a way of avoiding this problem, employers should implement an anti-
violence policy, including a statement "informing employees that if threats
of violence are made, the employer's response may include an investigation
of the individual's home and family life, substance abuse habits, weapons
ownership, criminal record, work history, statements to co-workers and
previous episodes of violent behavior. ' ,360 To date, the effectiveness of such
an anti-violence policy has not been challenged in the context of an inva-
sion of privacy claim.36'
Another context in which an employer can be held liable for off-duty
behavior is for discrimination. For example, off-duty comments made by a
supervisor may become admissible in a discrimination case. In Cooley v.
Carmike Cinemas, Inc., an employee sued an employer for age discrimina-
tion.3 62 Two off-duty statements made by Michael Patrick, the president,
CEO, and principal stockholder of Carmike, became an issue in the case.363
The first comment involved Patrick's displeasure about spending Thanks-
giving with his parents and grandmother, because he did not "'like to be
around old people.' ,364 The second statement was made when Patrick was
eighteen years old, after he saw the movie "Wild in the Streets. 3 65 He al-
legedly said "'[elverybody over 30 years old needs to be put in a pen.
Yeah, if they don't want to be put in a pen.., they should be confined to a
concentration camp."366 Affirming a jury verdict in favor of the employee,
the Sixth Circuit found that the error, if any, on the part of the trial court in
letting the jury hear the two statements was "harmless," since there was
ployees must look to workers' compensation laws as a remedy. See, e.g., Campbell v. Jack-
son Bus. Forms Co., 841 F. Supp. 772, 774 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (noting how a negligent su-
pervision of employees claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Mississippi
workers' compensation law). Lockheed could be held liable for intentionally endangering
its workers.
360. Steven Hymowitz, "When Violence Hits Home" - Laws That Impact An
Employer's Response to Violence Affecting the Workplace 7 (Mar. 19-22, 2003) (unpub-
lished manuscript presented at the ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law, Employment
Rights & Responsibilities Committee 2003 Mid-Winter Meeting, on file with author). Such
a policy must comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681 (1998). Hymowitz, supra note 360, at 7 n.7.
361. Given various courts' receptiveness to non-fratemization policies, see supra
Part II.B.2 (discussing various employer non-fraternization policy cases), there is a reason-
able likelihood that such a policy would be upheld and could be used to defeat an invasion
of privacy cause of action.
362. 25 F.3d 1325, 1327 (6th Cir. 1994).
363. Id. at 1327, 1329.
364. Id. at 1329.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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other sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.367 Similarly, in Har-
din v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., the plaintiff attempted to use a co-worker's
off-duty racist statements about African-American women to support her
race discrimination claim.368 Ultimately, the plaintiffs attempt was unsuc-
cessful, but it certainly created an issue in the case, probably because the
statements were so derogatory.
369
A third context of employer liability for off-duty conduct involves
sexual harassment. Often, one of the justifications for non-fraternization
policies is the desire to avoid behavior that could ultimately result in a sex-
ual harassment claim.3 71 Such policies have been repeatedly upheld as rea-
sonable37' and not in violation of public policy.3 72 Work-related sexual har-
assment that occurs off-site may be actionable if there is a "legally
sufficient nexus between the employment relationship and the act of har-
assment. ' ' 373 In the course of determining if an employer should be held li-
able for off-site sexual harassment, evidence revealing what transpired may
be required to be produced during discovery. For example, in one case a
videotape depicting a party attended by employees, strippers, and prosti-
tutes was required to be produced.374 Likewise, evidence that an employer
367. Id. at 1332.
368. 167 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1999).
369. Id. at 344-45.
370. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1313,
1314-15 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (describing how the plaintiff was terminated after violating a com-
pany no-dating rule designed to encourage supervisors to maintain "'professional relation-
ships"' with other employees and to discourage "relationships which might create any per-
ceived favoritism or liability"); Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1349,
1351 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (quoting an employer's anti-fraternization policy, which stated,
"'[fratemization which includes a supervisory or management employee may be perceived
as favoritism or sexual harassment').
371. But see supra Part II C.3 (discussing the disapproval of such policies in in-
terracial associational cases).
372. Sloan v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp., No. M2000-01794-COA-R3-
CV, 2002 WL 192571, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2002) (ruling that the employer's pol-
icy requiring one of two employees who intended to marry to quit their employment did not
violate public policy); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536, 538 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(concluding that the employer's rule preventing relatives from working on the same shift
applied to an unmarried couple living together and did not violate public policy).
373. Doe v. Capital Cities, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). If
there is not a sufficient connection between the acts and the workplace, the employer will
not be held liable for the off-site sexual harassment. Id. See, e.g., Minnis v. Or. Mut. Ins.
Co., 48 P.3d 137, 138 (Or. 2002) (holding employer was not vicariously liable for an off-
duty supervisor's alleged sexual assault of an employee); Capitol City Foods, Inc. v. Super.
Ct. of Sacramento County, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 422-23 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that al-
though work-related sexual harassment occurring off-site may be actionable, such was not
the case here); Santa Rosa City Employees' Ass'n v. City of Santa Rosa, No. C-97-2249
VRW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18569, at *10-12 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 1997) (dismissing the
plaintiff's claim of unwanted sexual advances after work by a supervisor for failure to state
a claim).
374. Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 183 F.R.D. 624, 627 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding
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has knowledge of an employee's sexual misconduct outside of work can be
discoverable and potentially used as evidence against the employer in a
sexual harassment case.375 Off-site behavior can also become an issue in
hostile environment cases.376
All of these contexts create situations in which it may be reasonable
for an employer to investigate an employee's off-duty behavior in an at-
tempt to prevent claims and to maintain a safe, professional working envi-
ronment.
IV. PROPOSAL: BALANCING REASONABLE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF
EMPLOYEES WITH THE NEEDS OF EMPLOYERS
Taking into consideration the common law jurisprudence, state statu-
tory law, and the very specific and limited protections under federal law, it
is clear that there are significant differences across the United States re-
garding the protection of an employee's right to privacy for off-duty con-
duct. The following proposed legislation would address many of the con-
texts in which employee privacy issues arise. The proposal is designed to
reconcile the tension between an employee's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy with an employer's potential liability.
Such a statute, balancing reasonable rights of privacy with the needs
of employers, could contain the following provisions:
1. Unless otherwise provided by law, it shall be unlawful
for an employer to take adverse employment action by re-
fusing to hire, demoting, discharging, or otherwise dis-
criminating against an individual with regard to terms,
conditions, compensation, or privileges of employment be-
cause of any of the following that take place outside of
working hours, off of the employer's premises, and with-
out use of the employer's equipment or property:
a. an individual's legal political activities outside of
working hours, including, but not limited to, running
for public office, campaigning for a candidate for po-
litical office, or participating in fund-raising activities
for the benefit of a candidate, political party, or political
that a videotape of an off-site Christmas party depicting lewd behavior was discoverable in a
sexual harassment case).
375. Cleveland v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
376. See Dashiell v. DivcoWest Group, Nos. H022288 & H022763, 2002 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 7034, at *5 (Ct. App. July 29, 2002) (discussing a regional vice presi-
dent's bragging about going to strip clubs, singles bars, and a hotel restaurant frequented by
high-priced prostitutes as an issue in a hostile environment case).
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advocacy group;
b. an individual's lawful use of legal consumable prod-
ucts, including tobacco products;
c. an individual's legal recreational activities for which
the employee receives no compensation, including, but
not limited to, sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading,
or the viewing of television and movies;
d. an individual's speech about a matter of public con-
cern; or
e. an individual's social, personal, professional, and
romantic relationships.
2. The provisions of subdivision one of this section shall
not be deemed to protect activity or information which:
a. creates a material conflict of interest related to the
employer's trade secrets, proprietary information, or
business interest;
b. creates a material conflict between the individual and
the employer regarding a bona fide occupational re-
quirement;
c. conflicts with reasonable non-fraternization policies,
including those which prohibit one relative from work-
ing in a direct supervisory relationship to the other and
those that prohibit an employee from continuing in a
relationship that causes an actual or potential conflict of
interest within the employer's business; or
d. subjects the employer to liability for the individual's
actions.
3. The provisions of this section do not abrogate existing
law regarding an employer's right to regulate off-duty
conduct for peace officers377 and teachers.378
377. See Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 637 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
a former deputy sheriffs adulterous affair was not constitutionally protected); Wieland v.
City of Arnold, 100 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987. 989 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (upholding the employer's
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4. Individuals claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory
or unfair employment practice as defined in this section
may bring a civil suit for damages and may sue for all
wages and benefits due up to and including the day of
judgment had the discriminatory action not occurred; rein-
statement/hiring; punitive damages for intentional conduct;
and court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Nothing in
this section, however, shall be construed to relieve an indi-
vidual seeking damages from the obligation to mitigate his
or her damages.
5. The court may award the prevailing party in such an ac-
tion court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
This proposal is intended to address many of the contexts in which
privacy has been made an issue regarding an employee's off-duty conduct.
Analogous to the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green 37 for discrimination cases, a plaintiff who brings an off-duty conduct
right to privacy claim could establish a prima facie case by showing that: 1)
the conduct at issue is protected by the statute; 2) he or she was qualified
for the position; and 3) there was an adverse employment action causally
related to the protected conduct. If the plaintiff meets these requirements,
discretion in disciplining a police officer for dating a woman on probation for a felony of-
fense because it potentially undermined his authority as a law enforcement officer); Mercure
v. Van Buren Township, 81 F. Supp. 2d 814, 822 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that a police
officer's termination as the result of his sexual affair with his supervisor's wife did not vio-
late his constitutional right to privacy).
378. A number of states have laws regulating the conduct of teachers, including
prohibiting off-duty behavior that is considered "immoral." See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
14.20.170(2) (Michie 2003) (defining immorality as "the commission of an act that, under
the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude"); CAL. EDUC. CODE §
44434 (West 2003) (citing "immoral and unprofessional conduct, profanity, intemperance,
or evident unfitness for teaching" as grounds for recommendation for revocation); GA.
CODE ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4) (2001) (listing immorality as grounds for termination or sus-
pension of a teacher); Mo. STAT. § 168.114(2) (West 2000) (dictating that the board may
dismiss a teacher for "immoral conduct" without more of a definition); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115C-325(e)(1)(b) (2003) (listing immorality as grounds for dismissal or demotion); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-501 (2003) (listing immorality as "'[c]onduct unbecoming to a member
of the teaching profession"'); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-2-8 (Michie 2003) (declaring that
a board may suspend or dismiss any teacher for immorality). For a discussion about the off-
duty conduct of teachers, see generally, Ruth L. Davidson, John L. Strope, Jr., & Donald F.
Verling, The Personal Lives and Professional Responsibilities of P-12 Educators: Off-Duty
Conduct as Grounds for Adverse Employment Actions, 171 West's Ed. Law Rep. 691
(2003).
379. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(outlining the plaintiffs prima facie case for Title VII racial discrimination claims).
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then the burden should shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse action.3" If the employer
meets this burden, then the plaintiff should have the opportunity to show
that the employer's stated reason for the adverse action was in fact pre-
text."'
V. CONCLUSION
When there is no legitimate business-related reason for an employer to
use an employee's off-duty conduct as the basis for an adverse employment
decision, the employer should not be allowed metaphorically to "open wide
the back door" of an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy. As it
stands now, there is no uniform standard in the United States to determine
when an employer can use an employee's off-duty conduct as the basis for
an adverse employment decision. Common law tort theories offer some
protection against the disclosure of "private" information, yet there is a
whole range of personal non-private information that many employers can
currently use against employees. State law varies widely from offering no
protection for off-duty activities, to protecting specific categories of be-
havior, such as the lawful use of consumable products, engaging in political
activities, and participating in legal recreational activities. Moreover, there
is no federal statute explicitly protecting employees from adverse employ-
ment action based on off-duty behavior. Although several laws are de-
signed to protect aspects of employees' personal lives, they are very limited
in scope. Thus, even though an employee's right to privacy regarding off-
duty conduct has become more defined, employers lack clear benchmarks
for determining what information they can legally use.
This lack of definition is particularly problematic for employers with
workers in multiple states, because state statutory protection for off-duty
conduct varies so widely. From an employee's perspective, it may seem
inherently unfair for an employer to make an adverse employment decision
based on information that may be irrelevant to job performance and does
not expose the employer to potential liability. The proposal set forth in this
article is designed to protect employees from adverse action based on off-
duty conduct when that activity is not detrimental to the employer. Build-
ing on the evolving standard for reasonable expectation of privacy for em-
ployees, the proposal would codify a standard that balances employee
rights with employer liability. Returning to the opening hypothetical sce-
narios involving adverse employment action illustrates the necessity for
such a standard. In most states, the employees in the hypotheticals could
be fired or have other adverse action taken against them with little or no le-
380. Id.
381. Id. at 804.
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gal recourse.382 Under the proposal, however, each employee's situation
would be balanced with the employer's interests to determine the degree of
protection. For example, if Bob's pro-gay political and social activities
create a material conflict with his employer regarding a bona fide occupa-
tional requirement, then his firm acted appropriately in removing him from
the case. Yet, if his activities do not interfere with his ability to carry out
the responsibilities of his position then, under the proposal, he has been
wrongfully discriminated against. Similarly, Sara's financial mismanage-
ment of her personal checking account should not be material to her em-
ployer's business as long as she is able to carry out her duties as a teller
competently.
In the context of associational privacy, if Grace and Sam's employer
has a reasonable non-fraternization policy, the policy should be honored if
Grace and Sam's relationship causes an actual or potential conflict of inter-
est with the employer. For example, it would be inappropriate for Grace to
be in a direct supervisory role where she would be responsible for Sam's
performance evaluations. A relationship that does not create any actual or
potential conflict of interest, however, should not subject an employee to
adverse employment action. Accordingly, to the extent that Andrew's af-
fair takes place completely outside of his workplace and he fully carries out
his employment duties, this off-duty conduct should not be the basis for
termination.
A more nebulous situation is presented by Dwayne, the vocal auto
worker who wrote an inflammatory editorial denouncing SUV owners. It
would need to be determined whether his speech related to a matter of pub-
lic concern and, if so, the speech may be protected. Even if the speech at
issue does pertain to a matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community, however, it still may not be protected under the proposal if it
creates a material conflict with the business interest of his employer. This
standard balances an employee's right to speak out, yet also protects em-
ployers from gratuitous speech by employees that could hurt the em-
ployer' s business.
These hypothetical scenarios are designed to depict off-duty behavior
that is largely unprotected under current law and to show that such behav-
ior should only subject the employee to adverse employment action if the
activity has some effect on the employer. Overall, the proposed statutory
language would protect employees' reasonable expectation of privacy for
their off-duty conduct and also protect employers' business interests, as
well as their ability to avoid liability.
382. See supra pgs. 629-630.
